Australian Left Review No.25 June-July 1970 by Cahill, Rowan
Australian
Review
AARONS 
O'NEILL
CONGRESS AND  AFTER
briel KOLKO
^TURE OF VIETN AM  W AR
bln BLACKBURN
OF FILIPINO REVOLUTION
[
NlVERstTY
26
U
2m<
H in o s
a t  the  G P O  S y d n e y ,  t o r  t r a n s m i s s i o n  t h r o u g h  the  p o i t  as a p e r i o d i ca l
June-Juiy ,  19 7 0  Contents
1 EDITORS’ COMMENTS
3 THE NATURE OF THE VIETNAM WAR
Gabriel Kolko
15 THE WORKING CLASS AND REVOLUTION
Bernie Taft
21 REBIRTH OF THE FILIPINO REVOLUTION
Robin Blackburn
32 THE WORK OF LUKACS
Jack Blake
37 STATEMENT FOR THE SEVENTIES
45 THE CONGRESS AND AFTER
Eric Aarons
56 THE CONGRESS AND AFTER
Dan O’Neill
66 INTERVIEW WITH MARKOS DRAGOUMIS
72 DISCUSSION
T o w a r d s  Sc ie n t i f i c  H u m a n i s t  S o c ia l i sm
76 BOOKS
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW is a m arxist journal of inform ation, 
analysis and discussion on economics, politics, trade unionism, history, 
philosophy, science and art, lor the prom otion of socialist ideas.
Published two m onthly.
Single copies, 40c; Yearly subscription, $2.20; Two years, $4.00 
ED ITO R IA L BOARD: Eric Aarons, Jim  Baird, Rowan Cahill, Leon 
C antrell. Laurie Carmichael, Alastair Davidson, R ichard Dixon, Doug 
Kirsner, Dan O ’Neill, Mavis Robertson, Bernie Taft.
BUSINESS MANAGER: 168 Day Street, Sydney 2000. Phone: 26-2161. 
POSTAL ADDRESS Box A247, Sydney South Post Office 2000.
Editors' Comments
UNIVERSITY OCCUPATION
SINCE MARCH THIS YEAR a war has been waged on the Sydney 
University Campus. And there have been casualties —  5 students 
expelled (3 of them have received “suspended expulsions”). The 
term “war” is applicable because of the methods employed by the 
university administration against the campus radicals —  informers, 
cameramen to photograph those involved in a 24 hour occupation 
of the Administration offices, “strongarm men” to provoke what 
could be termed “student violence”, Supreme Court injunctions to 
restrain radicals from further militancy, and expulsions for those 
who dared to defy the dictates of the university administrators.
1
The current struggle at Sydney began over an issue which chal­
lenged the validity of the university’s entry standards (matriculation 
requirements), connected as they are with the political device of 
“quotas” (a tool the government employs to regulate the number of 
students engaged in tertiary studies, thus minimising Budget allo­
cations to education, freeing these for more important capitalist 
priorities —  the Vietnam war and defence for example.)
The challenge eventually manifested itself in a 24 hour occupation 
of the university Administration offices, and wafe dealt with in the 
manner outlined above. This rampant and savage repression points 
to one thing, that those who engaged in it felt that something vital 
was at stake. It was not merely the desire to restore “law and 
order” to the campus but through the restoration of this to cripple 
the radical movement.
On the one hand the struggle at Sydney is a power struggle. Who 
will control the campus and university education — the legally 
authorised administration (open as they are to pressures from the 
State and business interests), or the forces now seeking power, 
those who are ruled, the powerless —  the students and staff?
The crippling of the radicals would ensure that power on campus 
remained in the hands of the administration, removing the perceived 
threat of it shifting into those of the students and staff. On the 
other hand the crippling of the radicals would remove the continual 
threat and presence of dissent and student unrest on campus; 
further it would curtail the activities of radicals in using the 
campus for organising against capitalist society.
The Vice-Chancellor at Sydney University is himself an ex-radical. 
He knows how to fight radicals — isolate them, destroy their basis 
for mass support, pick off the leaders. No doubt he is encouraged 
in his repression by the lack of support the exclusion of Albert 
Langer from Monash earlier this year received from the students 
there.
It is a safe bet that the other Australian Vice-Chancellors are 
sitting, watching what is happening at Sydney. For if radicalism 
is successfully smashed there at the current most radical Australian 
university, it will be the signal for the others to follow and with 
similar tactics to smash their campus radicals. Whatever happens 
at Sydney will have an effect on every other university campus in 
Australia.
R.J.C.
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Gabriel Kolko
The Nature of the Vietnam War
TH ERE ARE NO CENSUS TAKERS of the barbarism of the 20th 
century, and there has been far too much of it to measure. The 
executioners are not willing, and the victims are rarely able, to 
provide exact details. What is certain in Vietnam, save to those 
who have neither the will nor the interest to confront truth, is the 
general magnitude and quality of the United States’ combat against 
the Vietnamese. This relationship necessarily has a logic and 
structure which leads to war crimes as the inevitable consequence 
of a war that is intrinsically criminal. More important, the war is 
the outcome of post-World War II American policy toward the 
world and its efforts to resolve the United States’ greatest dilemma
G abriel Kolko is Prolessor of H istory a t the State University of New York. He 
is a recognised au thority  on Am erican diplom atic history, and au tho r of a 
num ber of books including T he Roots of American Foreign Policy: A n Analysis 
of Power and Purpose (see Jo h n  Playford's review. A I.R  No. f>, 1060).
T h is report was first presented to the  Congressional Conference on "W ar and 
N ational Responsibility", held in W ashington February 20-21. 1070. It was 
then  presented to the Fifth Stockholm Conference on Vietnam , March 2H-30.
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in the second half of this century: to relate its industrial power to 
the political and ideological realities of popular revolutionary move­
ments in the Third World.
After the Second World War the United States pursued its diplo­
macy on the traditional postulate of military power ultimately being 
based on physical plant, economic capacity and the ability 10 
destroy it. TTiis assumption was also a definition of the nature of 
the world conflict, which prior to 1950 had always been between 
industrial nations, and after 1945 designated the Soviet Union as 
the primary threat to American security and interests. Such a 
premise, which not so much discounted as ignored the mobilising 
potential of ideology and the capability of Third World guerrilla and 
liberation movements, gave the United States supreme confidence in 
the efficacy and strategic doctrines of its own military. This armed 
force was designed essentially to operate against a centralised, 
industrial society, a reinforcing proposition Washington thought 
the military and diplomatic facts, as well as its own economic 
priorities, warranted. Every strategy has a price tag, and strategic 
bombing has a predictable and relatively low cost, but it also 
necessitated a convenient and vulnerable industrial enemy.
The Korean war, which almost resulted in an American defeat 
in Korea, shattered a half-century of conventional wisdom and 
raised a critical dilemma. It immediately proved the limits of 
existing military strategy and technology against decentralised, non­
industrial nations. Apart from political or humanitarian considera­
tions, there were no decisive targets against which to employ the 
atomic military technology on which the US had pinned the bulk 
of its hopes and money.
After weakening its power everywhere else in the world, and 
embarking on what was to become the second most expensive war 
in its history, the United States waged the Korean war with “conven­
tional” arms intended for combat between industrial nations. Fought 
against comparatively poorly armed peasants, it was a war unlike 
any in modem history, and the Korean precedent reveals the 
principles and tactics to emerge in Vietnam in a more intensive 
form. Within three months the US destroyed all usual strategic 
targets in North Korea and over the last two years of the war it 
dropped about six times the tonnage used during the first year. 
Camps for non-combatants contained over 400,000 persons under 
guard, one-eighth of whom died of disease and starvation. Half 
the South Korean population was homeless or refugees by early 
1951, 2.5 million were refugees at war’s end, twice that number 
were on relief, over one million South Korean civilians died, and 
estimates of North Korea's losses are greater yet. As Major
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General Emmet O’Donnell Jnr., head of the Far Eastern Bomber 
Command, reported to the Senate in mid-1951: “I would say that 
the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. 
Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the 
name.”1 The Korean war, in brief, became a war against an entire 
nation, civilians and soldiers, Communists and anti-Communists 
alike, with everything regarded as a legitimate target for attack. By 
1953, when the US was farther from military victory or mastery 
than in the fall of 1950, the most important undamaged targets 
were the 20 irrigation o'ams so vital to the rice crop and civilian 
population of the North. Restraints operated until mid-May 1953, 
when five of these dams were destroyed, in one instance resulting 
in a flash flood that scooped clean 27 miles of valley.
For the Koreans, the war’s magnitude led to vast human suffering, 
but the United States learned that it was unable to translate its 
immense firepower into military or political victory for itself or its 
allies. There was, in brief, no conceivable relationship between 
the expenditure of arms and political or military results obtained. 
As the official Army history relates, utilising high mobility, decen­
tralisation and tunnel defences, the North Korean and Chinese 
armies greatly improved their equipment and logistics and ended 
the war “a formidable foe who bore little resemblance to the feeble 
nation of World War II.”2 Massive firepower had resulted in 
enormous civilian casualties and barbarism, but inhumanity was not 
victory.
The implications of Korea to the United States’ future were 
monumental, conjuring up the prospect of political and military 
defeat in Asia and vividly revealing the limits of its power. Massive 
land armies were both very expensive and of dubious utility, and 
it was in this context that John Foster Dulles attempted to break
T h e  following abbreviations are  used in  the notes:
NYT — New  York Times.
DOD — U.S. House, Com m ittee on A ppropriations, Hearings, D epartm ent of 
Defence Appropriations, the app ro p ria te  fiscal year being considered, part, 
and  page.
1 U.S. Senate, Committees on Arm ed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings: 
M ilitary Situation in the Far East. 82:1. (W ashington, 1951), p. 3075.
2 W alter G. Hermes, Truce T en t and F ighting Front [” U S. Army in the Korean 
W ar” official series] (W ashington, 1966), p. 499. For o ther data  on Korea, see 
also R obert Frank Futrell, T h e  U nited States A ir Force in Korea, 1950-1953 
(New York, 1961), pp. 195, 344, 452-53, 482-83, 645; Hermes, Truce T en t, pp. 
821-24, 460-61, 477-511; U.S. Senate, M ilitary Situation, pp. 3545-46; Voice of 
Korea, February 21, 1951, p. 493, Ju n e  25, 1951, p. 518; David Rccs, Korea: 
T h e  L im ited  War (New York, 1964), pp. 440-41; no au thor, "T h e  Attack on 
the  Irrigation  Dams of N orth Korea", A ir  University Quarterly, W in ter 1953-54, 
pp. 40-61.
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through the enigma with his “massive retaliation aeoaie — never 
satisfactorily translating it into a coherent and relevant strategy. 
Not only did Soviet nuclear power rule out attacking Russia with 
impunity, but even Washington in spring 1954 doubted whether 
Vietnamese peasants could be made to stop fighting if Moscow 
were destroyed, and the debate over employing atomic bombs at 
Dien Bien Phu only revealed that in close combat and mixed battle 
lines atomic bombs indiscriminately destroy friend and foe alike.
The dilemma of relating American technology to agrarian and 
decentralised societies was not resolved by the time President 
Kennedy came to office. Without delving into the “counter- 
insurgency” planning and assumptions which the President imme­
diately authorised General Maxwell Taylor to co-ordinate and 
study, it is sufficient to observe not only that the US began making 
its commitments in Vietnam keenly aware of the failures of the 
past, but it was still encumbered with the same limitations which 
might only repeat the Korean precedent of mass firepower, whole­
sale destruction of populations, and political-military failure. Nor 
is it necessary to review the familiar history of how the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations intensified their involvement in Viet­
nam. More relevant is the distinctive character of that war, and 
the assumptions and manner in which the United States has employed 
its military might. I propose to outline the political and environ­
mental structure of the war and to show why the United States 
consciously employs a technology that is quantitatively far greater 
than that used in Korea but inevitably requires the same outcome 
in Vietnam: the destruction of untold masses of people and their 
society, and the concomitant moral immunisation of the American 
civilians and soldiers called upon to sustain and implement the 
Government’s grand strategy.
A War Without Fronts
One of the most significant realities of the war in Vietnam, a fact 
which, makes “legal” combat impossible and necessitates endless 
crimes against civilians and combatants alike, is the absence of 
conventional military fronts and areas of uncontested American 
control. The Tet Offensive proved once again that combat can 
occur anywhere and that the military initiative rests with the NLF. 
American forces, in reality, form enclaves in a sea of hostility and 
instability, able temporarily to contest NLF physical control over 
large regions but incapable of substituting Saigon’s political infra­
structure to establish durable control by winning the political and 
ideological loyalties of the large majority of the people. Perhaps 
most ironically, the NLF has been able to transform this American 
presence, which it has not been able to remove physically, into
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a symbiotic relationship from which they extract maximum possible 
assets in what is intrinsically an intolerable and undesired situation. 
For this reason as well, they are able to endure the war the longest, 
prevail, and win at the end, even should they lose a great number 
of military encounters.
The Pentagon’s statements notwithstanding, there now exists more 
than sufficient documentation proving that the US claims to “control”
67 per cent of the South Vietnamese population, as before Tet 
1968, or 92 per cent as of late 1969, bear no relationship to reality.1 
Suffice it to say, the Pentagon also maintains private figures, data 
that simply reinforces the inescapable conclusions of a logical 
analysis of its own releases, that a very substantial majority of 
the South Vietnamese are not under the physical “control” of 
either the Saigon regime or US forces. Apart from political loyalty, 
which claims on hamlet control ignore, the supreme irony of the 
war in Vietnam is that hamlets labelled “secure” for public purposes, 
such as Song My, are often the hardest hit by American arms. The 
reason is fundamental: areas, villages, and large population con­
centrations the NLF operationally controls frequently co-operate 
in Saigon-sponsored surveys and projects to spare themselves un­
necessary conflict with US and Saigon forces. To lie about the 
presence of the NLF to a visiting pacification officer is a small 
matter in comparison to the certain military consequences the truth 
will invite. What the Pentagon describes as the “secure” area in 
Vietnam is often a staging and economic base as secure and vital 
to the NLF as its explicitly identified liberated zones.
Therefore we read innumerable accounts of trade and movement 
between Saigon-“controlled” areas and those of the NLF, and of 
“friendly” villagers and Saigon’s Popular Forces (only one-eighth 
of whom are trusted with arms) who fail to report NLF combat 
units and infrastructures. Hence, too, the existence of at least
5,000 NLF political workers in the greater Saigon area, to use 
minimal American figures, and the undoubted accuracy of the NLF 
claim to have parallel governments in all major cities and towns. 
American admissions that three-quarters of the NLF budget in 1968 
was raised from taxes collected from one-half the Vietnamese 
population, that Saigon’s eight largest corporations paid an average 
of $100,000 each in taxes to the NLF, or that it purchases vast 
quantities of supplies from “secure” towns, is much more to the
:i A T T , October 16, 1969; Rep. Jo h n  V. T unney  [U.S. House, Com m ittee on 
Foreign Affairs], Report: M easuring H am let Security in I'ietnam . December
1968. 90:2. (W ashington, 1969), passim; W illiam  G. Corson, The Betrayal (New 
York, 1968), p. 231-42; U.S. Senate, Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, Report: 
Vietnam: December 1969. February  2. 1970. 91:2 (W ashington, 1970), p p . 4-6; 
Tow nsend Hoopes, T he L im its o f In tervention  (New York, 1969), pp. 188-89.
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point.4 To some critical measure, “secure” areas are both a part 
of, and vital to, the NLF. And to be “secure” is not to be a 
continuous free-fire zone. The question is not who claims “control” 
but who really possesses it. For the most part, such control as 
the US may have is temporary and ultimately is based on its ability 
and willingness to apply firepower, and certainly is not a consequence 
of any popular support for its financed and universally corrupt 
regimes in Saigon.
The refugee camps and program are good examples of the 
NLF’s ability to turn what the US intends as adversity into a 
dual-edged institution from which they may gain as much as a 
repressive situation allows —  so long as it retains the respect and 
political loyalties of the people. These camps were both the 
inevitable by-product of America’s massive firepower applied to 
all Vietnam and its explicit desire to reconcentrate the population 
so as to better control it. “You have to be able to separate the 
sheep from the goats,” to quote one Pentagon-sponsored analyst in 
1966. “The way to do it is harsh. You would have to put all 
military age males in the army or in camps as you pacify the 
country. Anyone not in the army or in camp is a target. He’s 
either a Viet Cong or is helping them.”5
By May 1969 the war had produced 3,153,000 refugees since 
1965, 612,000 still remained in camps and with only a tiny fraction 
having been resettled in their original villages. The large majority 
of the refugees, as every objective account agrees, were seeking to 
escape the free-fire zones and rain of fire the Americans were 
showering on them. Their political loyalties were anti-Saigon 
in the large majority of cases, and the intense squalor, degradation, 
and corruption in the camps undoubtedly mitigates such small 
sympathy for the anti-NLF cause as may exist. No less significant 
about the camps is the very high percentage of old men, women, 
and children in them —  that is, non-combatants. In this sense, 
by entering the American camps refugees escape the American 
bombs while the younger men generally remain in the combat 
areas. Roger Hilsman put it another way in 1967: “I think it 
would be a mistake to think that the refugees come toward the 
Government side out of sympathy. . . (They) come toward the 
Government side simply because the Vietcong do not bomb, and 
that they will not at least be bombed and shelled. I have greater
* W all Street Journal, November 5, 1969; U.S. Senate, Vietnam: December 1969, 
p. 8; Katsuichi H onda, T h e  N ational Liberation Front [translations from Asa hi 
S h im b u n ] (Tokyo, 1968), passim; (London) Sunday Tim es, September 28, 1969; 
NYT, Novem ber 12, 1969; W all Street Journal, Ju ly  9, 1969.
8 Lloyd N orm an, "W ar W ithou t Gadgets’, A rm y, December 1966, p. 58. See also 
U.S. Senate, Vietnam: December 1969, p. 4.
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worries that some of the refugee camps are rest areas for the 
Vietcong, precisely because of this.”8
Refugee camps therefore become incubators of opposition as well 
as potential shelters for it, just as many reported NLF defectors, 
very few of whom are regular combatants, are now suspected of 
returning to NLF ranks after a period of recuperation. Such 
integration of the institutional structure of “secure” areas with 
that which the NLF dominates, this profound lack of clear lines and 
commitments among the Vietnamese, attains its ultimate danger for 
the Americans when it is revealed that the Vietnamese support for 
the N LF extends to parts of the highest levels of the Saigon regime. 
We know little of the process by which Vu Ngoc Nha, Huynh Van 
Trong, and their 39 associates penetrated the intimate circle of 
the Thieu regime and became privy to its secrets, but it is certain 
that many officers, soldiers and administrators of the Saigon regime 
are secrtetly committed to the NLF cause, and it is no less certain 
that most other Saigon leaders are deeply dedicated to enriching 
themselves, even via trade with the NLF regions, and are totally 
unreliable for the US’s ultimate purposes. Such an army of 
unwilling conscripts, corrupt officers and politically unreliable 
elements in their midst is a dubious asset to the US and alone 
scarcely an unmanageable threat to the NLF. Hence the chimera 
of “Vietnamisation”. The various Administrations have known all 
this, and much more.
It is one of the lessons of 20th century history that repression 
and social disintegration generate forces of opposition that otherwise 
would not have existed and Vietnam is no exception. No one can 
comprehend the development and success of the NLF without appre­
ciating this fact. Vietnamese forced out of their villages by air 
and artillery strikes and into decrepit and unsanitary camps know 
full well that the Americans are responsible. The army of prosti­
tutes are aware of the source of their degradation. The peasant 
whose crops are defoliated knows who to blame. Apart from its 
attractive political program and land reform policy, the NLF has 
successfully capitalised on the near universal Vietnamese hatred of 
foreign invaders, a fact that has made its political infrastructure
# U.S. Senate, Committee on the  Judiciary , Hearings: Civilian Casualty, Social 
W elfare, and Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. !'0:1. (W ashington, 1968), 
p. 145. See also ibid., pp . 66-68, 76, 124, 143, 321; NYT, Novem ber 22, 1969, 
January  22, 1970; Tom  Bucklcv, “W hat's Life Like in Vietcong T errito ry ," New  
York T im es Magazine, November 23, 1969, p. 140; U.S. Senate, Com m ittee on 
the Judiciary , Hearings: Civilian Casualty, Social Welfare and Refugee Problems 
in South Vietnam. 91:1. (W ashington, 1969), p. 13.
7 NYT, November 4, 1969; U.S. Senate, Vietnam: December 1969, p. 5 and
passim; Hoopes, Lim its of In terven tion , p. 188; NYT. November 21, 29, 30, 
1969; W all Street Journal, Novem ber 5, 1969. (Missing in our tex t—Ed ).
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and loyalties of the people to it increasingly durable even as 
growing firepower is inflicted upon them. “They say this village 
is 80 per cent VC supporters,” one American officer commented 
last September as his men combed a village. “By the time we 
finish this it will be 95 per cent.”s Such insight is scarcely atpyical, 
but appears to be universal in the available documents on this 
aspect of the war.
This realism on repression intensifying resistance, as well as 
every other phase of the struggle in Vietnam I have mentioned, 
sets the indispensable context in which the US applies its military 
power, for it long ago abandoned operating within the acknowledged 
political limits of South Vietnam. More precisely, by employing 
sheer physical might, the US has sought to compensate for and 
transcend its unavoidable political weaknesses in its Vietnam 
adventure. The various men in the White House and Pentagon 
know better than any of us that the lines are indeed everywhere, 
and that the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly real and potential 
enemies. And since the Vietnamese long ceased to be promising 
ideological targets, tractable to successive corrupt regimes, they 
have virtually all become physical targets everywhere. Quite apart 
from the results —  for the United States is slowly learning that its 
efforts have become both militarily insufficient and politically self- 
defeating —  the necessary logic of American military strategy in 
Vietnam is to wage war against the entire Vietnamese people, men, 
women and children alike, wherever they may be found. So long 
as it remains in Vietnam, it cannot fight another kind of war 
with any more hope of success.
Machines Against People: American Military Premises
The original theory of counter-insurgency in White House circles 
in 1961 was that a limited number of men, wise in the ways of 
guerrilla ideology and tactics, could enter the jungles with conven­
tional small arms and win. Given the political, military and ideo­
logical realities, this premise by 1964 was utterly discredited, and 
there followed a major scramble to develop new “miracle” weapons 
intended to overcome the NLF’s clear military superiority. The 
problem, however, is that it requires five to seven years to translate 
a sophisticated weapons concept into adequate field deployment, 
and in 1965 weapons ideas already in progress were designed over­
whelmingly for a war in Europe. A mass of exotic crash research
* NYT, Septem ber 24, 1969. See also U.S. Senate, Civilian Casualty . . 90:1, p. 
67; Hoopes, Lim its of In terven tion , pp. 68-73; U.S. House, Com m ittee on 
Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Chemical-Biological Warfare: U.S. Policies and  
In ternational Effects. 91:1 (W ashington, 1970), pp. 97 , 250-51; Buckley, New  
York T im es Magazine, pp. 137, 140.
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proposals proved, on the whole, to be expensive miscarriages, and 
it was already commissioned projects in helicopters and gunships 
that were most readily transferable to the Vietnam context. The 
helicopter's distinctive value pointed to the defining objective 
condition of the military phase of the Vietnam war: decentralisation 
and a lack of military targets. Without the mobility the helicopter 
provided, General Westmoreland has estimated, one million more 
troops would have been required to fight the same war on the 
ground.9
While the United States has sought to discover and procure 
weapons uniquely designed for the decentralised agrarian and jungle 
environment, it has also attempted to utilise existing weapons first 
designed for such concentrated strategic targets as industry and 
air-missile bases. This, by necessity, has required employing weapons, 
such as the B52, originally constructed for intensive, nuclear war­
fare against stationary targets. It has adjusted for decentralised 
mobile targets simply by dropping much greater quantities of 
explosives of immense yield on vast regions with very few permanent 
military installations. Militarily, the United States has therefore 
fought the war with whatever decentralised-style weapons it could 
develop as well as the sheer quantity of firepower which “conven­
tional” weapons employ. The pre-eminent characteristic of both 
these approaches is that they are intrinsically utterly indiscriminate 
in that they strike entire populations. And while such strategy 
violates all international law regarding warfare, and is inherently 
geriocidal, it also adjusts to the political reality in South Vietnam 
that the NLF is and can be anywhere and that virtually the entire 
people is Washington’s enemy.
I am not contriving something the Pentagon does not already 
know. “The unparalleled, lavish use of firepower as a substitute 
for manpower,” writes one of its analysts in an official publica- 
1 tion, “is an outstanding characteristic of US military tactics in 
the Vietnam war.”10 From 315,000 tons of air ordnance dropped 
in Southeast Asia in 1965, the quantity by January-October 1969, 
the peak year of the war, reached 1,388,000 tons. Over that period,
4,580,000 tons were dropped in Southeast Asia, or six and one-half 
times that employed in Korea. To this we must add ground 
munitions, which rose from 577,000 tons in 1966 to 1,278,000 tons 
in the first 11 months of 1969. And to these destruction-intensive
# N orm an, Arm y, p. 56 and passim; DOD, 1969, Pt. i ,  pp. 33-34; 1)01), 1968, 
Pt. 3, p. 13; Brig. Gen. Lvnn D. Smith, "Facts, N ot O pinions", A rm y, December
1969, p. 26.
i f  R obert M. Kipp, “C ounterinsurgcncy From 30,000 Feet: T h e  B-52 in V ietnam ”, 
A ir University Review, January-February  1968, p. 17.
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weapons applied extensively we must also add the wide-impact 
decentralised weapons that are employed in ever greater quantities 
alone or in conjunction with traditional explosives. For the family 
of cluster bomb weapons and flechette rockets, which the Air Force 
rates as “highly successful ’, I have no procurement data. Suffice 
to say, these are exclusively anti-personnel weapons covering much 
wider areas than bombs. CS (a type of advanced tear gas) pro­
curement is one example: from 1965 to 1969 the amount purchased 
went up 24 times. Procurement for defoliants and anti-crop chemi­
cals is erratic because of inventory and production problems, though 
the Air Force’s far too conservative data on acreage sprayed has 
risen quite consistently from less than 100,000 acres in 1964 to 
an adjusted annual rate of 15 times that in 1969. Procurement in 
1964 was $1.7 million and $15.9 million in 1970, with an inventory 
in 1970 almost equal to new purchases.11
Translated into human terms, the US has made South Vietnam 
a sea of fire as a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a 
target. This is not accidental but intentional and intrinsic to the 
US’s strategic and political premises in the Vietnam war. By neces­
sity it destroys villages, slaughters all who are in the way, uproots 
families, and shatters a whole society. There is a mountain of 
illustrations, but let me take only one here —  that of the B52 which 
reveals how totally conscious this strategy is.
The B52s cost about $850 million to operate in Southeast Asia 
in fiscal 1970, a bit less than 1969 but far more than 1968, and 
they drop about 43,000 tons a month. On what? The one official 
survey of actual hits that I have been able to locate states that 
“enemy camps”, often villages full of civilians, “were where intelli­
gence said they would be” in only one-half the cases. In the other 
half, intelligence was faulty, and the camps were either not there 
or the VC had not been in the target area when the bombs fell.”12 
Then on whom did the bombs fall? On Vietnamese peasants in 
both cases, on thousands of Song Mys.
Stated another way, in 1968-69 the US used about 7700-7800 
tons of ground and air ordnance during an average day. At the 
time of the 1968 Tet offensive, the Pentagon estimates, NLF forces 
were consuming a peak of 27 tons of ammunition a day, and half 
that amount during an average day in April, 1969. Roughly,
11 Joseph W. M arshall [chief, Magazine k  Book Branch, D irectorate for D efense 
Inform ation, Office o f  the Asst. Sec. of Defense for Public Affairs] to G abriel 
Kolko, Decem ber 9, 1969; M arshall to Edw ard S. H erm an, Jan u ary  15, 1970. 
DOD, 1970, Pt. 4, p. 382, Pt. 6, p. 124, Pt. 2. p. 756; U.S. House, Chem ical- 
Biological Warfare, p. 364.
K ipp, A ir Unii'ersity Review, p. 17. See also DOD, 1970, Pt. 2, pp. 748-49.
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this is a ratio of 250 or 500 to one. Inequalities of similar 
magnitude appear when one compares overall supply, including 
food, which for all NLF and DRV forces in the south was 7,500 
tons per month at the end of 1968. At the beginning of 1968 
American fuel needs alone were 14 million tons a month.13 Out 
of this staggering ratio of conspicuous consumption has come only 
conspicuous failure for the US, but also a level of firepower that so 
far exceeds distinctions between combatants and non-combatants 
as to be necessarily aimed at all Vietnamese.
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In an air and mechanical war against an entire people, in which 
no fixed lines exist and high mobility and decentralisation give 
the NLF a decisive military advantage, barbarism can be the only 
consequence of the US’s sledge-hammer tactics. During Tet 1968, 
when the US learned that the “secure” areas can become part of 
the front when the NLF so chooses, US air and artillery strikes 
destroyed half of Mytho, with a population of 70,000, four-fifths 
of Hue’s inner city, more than one-third of Chaudoc, killed over
1,000 civilians in Ben Tre, 2,000 in Hue —  to cite only the better 
known of many examples.14 But what is more significant to the 
ultimate outcome of the war is that such barbarism is also accom­
panied by an ineffectuality —  entirely aside from the question of 
politics and economics —  which makes the US’s failure in Vietnam 
certain.
Indiscriminate firepower is likely to hit civilian targets simply 
because there are many more of them, and directly and indirectly 
that serves the US’s purpose as all Administrations define them. 
But we know enough about mass firepower and strategic bombing 
to know not merely that it is counter-productive politically but also 
an immense waste militarily. As a land war, the Vietnam campaign 
for the US has been a mixture of men and mobility via helicopters, 
with the NLF generally free to fight at terms, places and times 
°f its own choosing. And because of ideology and allegiance, 
the NLF always fills the critical organisational vacuum the Ameri­
cans and their sponsored Saigon regime leave behind. But even 
when in the field, the US soldier lacks both motivation and a concept 
°f the ideological and political nature of the war, which makes him 
tend toward terror and poor combat at one and the same time. Had 
he and his officers the will and knowledge to win— which, I add, would 
scarcely suffice to attain victory —  the American army would not 
be repeating the tale of Song My over and over again. For Song 
My is simply the foot soldier’s direct expression of the axiom of
13 M arshall to Herm an, Jan . 15, 1970; NYT, November 2. 1968; Gabriel Kolko, 
T h e  V ietnam  W ar and Diplomacy", London Bulletin, August 1969, p. 24.
l 4 Hoopes, Lim its of Intervention , pp. 141-42: NYT, January  22, 23, 1970.
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fire and terror that his superiors in Washington devise and command 
from behind desks. No one should expect the infantryman to 
comprehend the truths about the self-defeating consequences of 
terror and repression that have escaped the generals and politicians. 
The real war criminals in history never fire guns, never suffer dis­
comfort. The fact is, as the military discussions now reveal, that 
morale and motivation are low among troops, not merely toward the 
end of tours of duty, or when combat follows no pattern and “morale 
goes down and down”, to quote one Pentagon analyst, but also 
because an unwilling foreign conscript army has not and cannot 
in the 20th century win a colonial intervention.15
WE CAN SCARCELY COMPREHEND the war in Vietnam by 
concentrating on specific weapons and incidents, on Song My, B52s 
or defoliants. What is illegal and immoral, a crime against the 
Vietnamese and against civilisation as we think it should be, is the 
entire war and its intrinsic character. Mass bombing, the uprooting 
of populations, “search-and-destroy” —  all of this and far more 
is endemic to a war that can never be “legal” or moral so long 
as it is fought. For what is truly exceptional and unintended in 
Vietnam, from the Government’s viewpoint, are the B52 missions, 
defoliants and artillery attacks that do not ravage villages and 
fields. Specific weapons and incidents are deplorable, but we 
must see them as effects and not causes. The major undesired, 
accidental aspect of the entire Vietnam experience, as three Admin­
istrations planned it, was that the Vietnamese resistance, with its 
unshakable roots everywhere in that tortured nation, would survive 
and ultimately prevail rather than be destroyed by the most intense 
rain of fire ever inflicted on men and women. For the history 
of America’s role in Vietnam is not one of accident but rather of 
the failure of policy.
Given what is so purposeful and necessary to the United States’ 
war in Vietnam, and the impossibility and the undesirability of 
America relating to that nation by other than military means, 
there is only one way to terminate the endless war crimes system­
atically and daily committed there —  to end the intrinsically 
criminal war now, to withdraw all American forces immediately. 
And while the Vietnamese succor and heal their wounds, Americans 
must attempt to cure their own moribund social illness so that 
this nation will never again commit such folly and profound evil.
l® Francis J. West, "Stingray ’70”, U.S. N aval In stitu te  Proceedings, N o v e m b e r  
19(59, p. 33. See also DOD, 1970, Pt. 7, p. 91; S. O. Aquarius. “ M ilitary Discipline. 
T h e  Public and the Now G eneration”, A rm y, Jan u ary  1970, p. 26; James P- 
Sterba, "T h e  H ours of Boredom, T h e  Seconds of T e rro r”, New  York Times 
Magazine, February 8, 1970, pp. 3 Iff.
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Bernie Taft
The Working Class and Revolution
REVOLUTIONARIES, who aim to change society, are faced with a 
disturbing and puzzling contradiction in evaluating the industrial 
movement in Australia in 1970. On the one hand there is a clearly 
discernible rise in militancy and of struggle among significant and 
growing sections of blue and white collar workers. The eruption in 
the penal powers struggle and the breadth it developed are sympto­
matic of the processes at work. The changes in the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions, the replacement of Albert Monk by Bob 
Hawke, are an outward official reflection of the changes in the 
working-class movement over the last decade, the emergence of a 
younger, more militant, more modern leadership.
On the other hand, and alongside this growing militancy, socialist 
consciousness has dimmed. Socialism, the establishment of a social­
ist society, is not the issue among the workers that it was two or 
three decades ago. By and large the Australian workers accept our 
capitalist social system and its foundations. They are certainly not 
rebelling against it. They arc prepared to support some reforms, 
but reforms to improve the system, not to destroy it. This is the 
reality. The workers are ready for struggle for extra money, and 
against the penal powers, but not for the replacement of our system 
by a socialist system.
Bernie T a ft is a m em ber of the  editorial board of ALR, and a N ational Execu­
tive m em ber and Victorian State President of the CPA.
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For revolutionaries whose whole work is aimed at changing 
society, at arousing socialist consciousness among the people, this 
is a painful conclusion to come to. It poses the question: where 
are we going in the industrial movement, what are our perspectives? 
Are there realistic possibilities for advancing the revolutionary 
movement among the workers at present and the immediate future? 
Is it possible to be an effective revolutionary in the industrial move­
ment in present conditions? These questions have to be faced 
seriously and fearlessly.
They can only be answered on the basis of a realistic assessment 
of the position of the working class in our society, the changes 
which the Australian working class has undergone and is under­
going at present and likely future trends. Three features stand out 
in their effect on the Australian working class:
Firstly there has been a significant rise in the standard of living 
for the majority of workers, a growth of consumption of consumer 
goods, availability of jobs and the possibility of getting a better 
job —  for many a “place” in this society. The greater satisfaction 
of material needs (both real and artificially induced “needs”) is 
coupled with the second notable feature of our society —  mass 
manipulation of consciousness. This has led to the spread and 
acceptance of the values of our society, to apathy, to lack of 
concern and involvement, to a dimming of socialist consciousness. 
These two features, greater satisfaction of material needs and 
manipulation of consciousness in the interests of the ruling class, 
go together.
The scientific and technological revolution has made this possible. 
It has created the material possibilities of giving more goods to 
the workers whilst at the same time enormously increasing the 
profits of the capitalist class. It has also created the technological 
means of manipulating the mind far more effectively than in the 
past. The technology of modern communication allows the ideas 
and values of the ruling class to dominate the whole of society as 
never before. The mass media, TV, educational institutions, all 
help to spread these ideas and values. The ethos of the consumer 
society pervades all spheres of life.
Because capitalism can and does supply more goods, because 
in countries like ours it eases the most immediate direct pressure for 
physical survival for most people, the manipulation has been fairly 
effective. It is a modern version of the bread and circuses that 
the Roman slave owners provided. This situation places economic 
struggles into a different setting. Militancy on economic questions 
is essential for a better place in our capitalist society; it is for a
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greater share of the benefits that this society offers —  it does not 
necessarily challenge or threaten capitalism at all. This is consid­
erably different from the pre-war situation where economic struggles 
were only a small step removed from challenging the capitalist 
system as such, and in some circumstances, such as the 1929-33 
depression, actually did threaten the system. Today, economic 
demands can generally be absorbed and integrated. In fact today, 
unlike the past, economic militancy often goes, hand in hand with 
support for the existing system, as the one which makes such a 
struggle for a greater share possible. Militancy has become quite 
respectable. All sorts of professional people engage in militant 
actions on economic demands now.
What are the perspectives in Australia? With the economic 
expansion, with the mineral discoveries the ability of the ruling 
class to absorb economic demands is likely to grow. The position 
in the United States should serve as a warning. There militancy 
often goes hand in hand with extremely reactionary political attitudes. 
This makes it necessary for revolutionaries to take a different 
attitude to economic militancy in present conditions than they did 
in the past.
Fortunately the scientific and technological revolution has not 
only produced more goods and more effective manipulation, things 
which the capitalist class likes and uses to its own advantage. It 
is also creating other things which they don’t like and which set 
into motion anti-capitalist forces. This is the third big change: 
Modern technology needs skilled, highly trained people, it needs 
armies of skilled craftsmen, of technologists and of scientifically 
trained people. This has ushered in the education explosion — 
more schools, more and larger universities and other educational 
institution's, many more skilled workers with higher levels of 
education. The ruling class needs them to develop and make use 
of modern technology, to increase its profits.
So we get the strange situation Where on the one hand the 
ruling class has the most developed means of dulling people’s 
minds, of filling them with a false consciousness, yet at the same time- 
educates vast numbers of people, opening their minds, widening 
their horizon and developing their critical faculties. It is proving 
very difficult to educate people without increasing their capacity 
for independent judgment, though of course that is what the ruling 
class strives to do (see “Statement for the Seventies” in this issue). 
Moreover these people are no longer almost exclusively the sons 
and daughter^ of the rich, as in the past. The children of working 
people are better educated and better trained today.
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In addition, the development of modern “mass” society, its big, 
and impersonal bureaucratic structures, its remote decision making 
and lack of mass participation processes, all create a reaction, 
particularly among people who have been freed from the worries 
of direct physical survival and who are better educated —  a demand 
for a voice, a say. It creates a revulsion against the irrationality 
of the system. This is a mass phenomenon today. It will grow, 
it will spread, especially among the young, including the young 
workers. It arises from the nature of capitalist society, from the 
direction of the scientific and technological revolution. It creates 
a demand or a striving for more democracy, for greater freedom, 
for human dignity, however incoherently this is expressed at 
times. And it touches the most vital spots of the capitalist 
system, because capitalism cannot satisfy this demand without giving 
up control and domination, its class rule. This is unlike many 
economic demands which it can satisfy if it has to.
Because the scientific and technological revolution is carried 
out under the direction of and in the interests of the economically 
powerful classes, a growing gap arises between the advanced 
countries and the so-called under-developed countries. The bene­
fits in the shape of more consumer goods in the advanced Western 
countries are in growing contrast with the poverty and stagnation 
of the third world. This increases the social problems; for the 
people in the Western countries it also creates moral dilemmas, 
since it shows up the irrationality and brutality of the capitalist 
system. The war in Vietnam is the most glaring expression of this 
irrationality and brutality. All this highlights the gap between 
what the scientific and technological revolution does and what it 
could do, if directed socially, by society and not in the interests 
of the ruling class. The scientific and technological revolution 
and the changes that it is bringing into our world create more and 
more questioning, frustration, opposition and resistance.
It has fed the resistance in the third world and in the last few 
years it has brought growing questioning of capitalism and opposi­
tion to it in the Western countries. It manifested itself in the 
sixties, at first in the student movement in the USA, in West 
Germany, in France and Italy. But in 1968 it involved the working 
class in France in their millions, and in one fell swoop shattered 
the theories that claimed the “end” of the working class as a 
potentially revolutionary force and the “end of ideology”.
What does this analysis mean for the work of revolutionaries 
in the industrial movement? Of the three trends which are in 
evidence in the Australian working class, the last, the growing 
militancy, questioning and resistance is the most significant. It
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has a revolutionary potential. It will grow and spread. But it 
depends on the work, the tactics of revolutionary activists, in which 
direction it will develop —  whether it will simply lead to greater 
militancy on economic questions or whether it will be given a 
revolutionary direction and serve to activise the revolutionary 
potential of the Australian working class.
Certainly the work of revolutionaries in the industrial movement 
at present is not consciously and purposefully directed towards that 
aim. Among the obstacle!; preventing such a re-orientation of 
revolutionaries is the carrying over of attitudes and tactics from, 
a different, past period. Policies and tactics which are correct 
at one period can be quite incorrect and harmful in a different 
period. What is correct for the ebb is not cortect for the flow 
of the revolutionary movement.
We have had an ebb in the revolutionary movement in our 
country for a long time, perhaps 15 to 20 years. Revolutionaries 
have got into adaptive habits and defensive attitudes. This tends 
to happen when certain tactics are applied for a long period; 
they become fixed. It is affecting the work of revolutionaries in 
many areas. Many carry on as if we were still in the difficult 
fifties and in the early sixties. But so much has changed and 
is changing, calling for reassessment, for different attitudes, for 
new perspectives. What is new today is the upsurge of the 
movement. It is quite true that this by no means embraces all 
or the majority of the workers, as one can point to a great deal 
of apathy and inactivity which it would be foolish and dangerous 
to ignore. But what trends should a revolutionary party looking 
to the fu,ture base itself on? It should value and nurture this 
rising, growing trend.
Tactics which are sectarian in one situation and which isolate 
the vanguard can have the opposite effect in a different situation 
when the movement is rising. The adjustment is not automatic. 
When people get steeped in a certain way it is easy to go on, but 
difficult to change. Tactics harden into principles. An example 
is the attitude to “unity” by some militants. Unity is not an 
aim, it is a means to an aim. We oppose unity for unity’s 
sake. But unity has tended to become an end in itself for many 
militant activists.
The upsurge of militancy is at present reflected to a large extent 
on economic questions, partly because there is no adequate provi­
sion for other expressions which are present and which need to be 
given scope. Revolutionaries should work in such a way as to 
give this militancy a direction that will lead the workers to a
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revolutionary position. That is why it is necessary to extend the 
scope of industrial activities and raise such questions and demand^ 
as will bring the workers up against the system, that can’t be 
absorbed or fully absorbed, that involve them, develop their initia­
tive and awaken their revolutionary potential. This is possible 
today, and will increasingly become possible. Hence the accent 
needs to be on workers’ control demands, on job involvement, on 
job organisation, on industrial unionism, on involving the workers 
directly rather than doing things from on top, on breaking out of 
the confines of economic demands.
In Australia, due in no small measure to the work and influence 
of revolutionaries in the trade union movement, we have favorable 
conditions for developing the revolutionary trends in the industrial 
movement with a good deal of co-operation and assistance from 
some trade unions. It depends on the willingness and capacity 
of the revolutionaries, on how they are able to make use of the 
existing possibilities, whether the growing militancy, which will 
develop anyway, is channelled into areas that can be absorbed or 
whether it leads to a revolutionary upsurge of fhe Australian 
working class.
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Robin BLACKBURN
Rebirth of the Filipino Revolution
THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN MANILA over recent months mark 
the re-awakening of the liberation movement in a country where it 
has been twice cruelly robbed of victory just when it seemed on 
the brink of achieving it. In 1898 the Filipino Revolutionary 
Government controlled the whole country, confining their former 
Spanish colonial masters to the walled citadel inside the capital 
when the Spanish-American War broke. After a lightning victory 
over the Spanish the United States claimed the Philippines as its 
booty, although it took five long and bitter years and 70,000 US 
troops to make good this claim. In 1945 the Huks (Anti-Japanese 
Liberation Army) had succeeded in liberating nearly the whole of 
Luzon, the largest island which contains over half the population, 
when again the US army arrived to frustrate it; this time it was not 
until 1954 that a pro-American government could claim to have 
established a precarious social peace.
President Marcos was no doubt uneasily aware of this tradition 
when he branded the capture of a slice of his Malacanang Palace 
last January 30th as an ‘attempt to seize power’ by ‘Maoist 
elements’. Troops were ordered to fire on the demonstrators (six 
deaths and many hundreds of other casualties resulted) and two 
frigates were ordered to the Palace sea-front to rescue the President 
and his staff. Today a force of 5,000 soldiers has been permanently 
stationed within the Palace grounds. Despite the evident exag­
geration in Marcos’ description of this particular incident it is 
certainly part of a new revolutionary attempt to smash the neo­
colonial state in the Philippines.
As Marcos is aware, this State is a very strange, and far from 
invulnerable, historical excrescence. It seems to have been de­
signed to violate every generalisation the sociologists and political 
scientists have made about the modern state. Weber, for example,
R obin B lackburn is an editor of the  British Mrw Left Review. At the  invitation 
of A L R  he visited A ustralia in February this year following a stay in New 
Zealand, (see interview in A I.R  No. 24). He left A ustralia for the Philippines, 
and has contributed  this article analysing the revolution in that country.
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defined the state as the body which exercised the monopoly of 
legitimate force over a given area. In the Philippines the state 
does not any longer even seek to challenge the multiplication of 
armed groups which together exceed in size (and often the quality 
of their equipment) that of its own armed forces. Every political 
leader, every large landowner, every major company has its retinue 
of armed men quite apart from the private armies which hire 
themselves out to the highest bidder. It is this which provides the 
substance of the formal, Western-style, two-party bourgeois dem­
ocracy which has prevailed since ‘independence’ was granted in 
1946. It has ensured the continued rule of the possessing class 
and its foreign masters— but it has also ensured a genuine pluralism 
within the ruling group such that no faction (army, Sugar Block 
etc) has so far been able to monopolise effective political power. 
The two political parties, the ruling Nacionalistas and the opposition 
Liberals, are loose coalitions uniting the brokers of financial cor­
ruption and political violence. Both the present President and 
his predecessor, Macapagal, adroitly switched parties in order 
aggregate a decisive force and win ‘election’. At every level this 
exchange of party loyalties occurs with any change in the ruling j 
party. In Filipino political lingo this is known as acting ‘patriot- ' 
ically’ by ‘placing the interests of the nation above those of Party.’
As in many neo-colonial societies access to Government with its 
limitless opportunities for financial gain, is the chief source of 
capital accumulation since most other sources are foreign-owned.
Elections
The official Comelec (Commission on Elections) reports that 
“rampant over-spending, fraud and terrorism marked the last 
elections” held in November 1969. President Marcos spent over 
$50 million on his campaign and 72 political murders were officially 
recorded during, the election period. It added that although 
“terrorism was the most brazen and scandalous method employed 
by political warlords to subvert the people’s mandate, the Comelec 
cannot do much to prevent it because it lacks ample power over 
the law-enforcement agencies acting as its deputies”. Indeed 
it confessed that “the conduct of Comelec personnel contributed 
to the disruption of orderly elections”. In one constituency in 
Southern Cebu the Liberals controlled one polling station, the 
Nacionalistas the other. The Liberals announced that every single 
one of the 9,400 registered voters had opted for their man; their 
timidity was rebuked when the Nacionalistas won with a vote for 
their candidate some 2,000 greater than the registered total. This 
was tame compared with the goings-on in the Northern Island of 
Batanes where an armed band known as the Suzuki Boys took over
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the whole island for election time, murdering the local Public 
Prosecutor, closing the airport, occupying the radio and telegraph 
offices as well as the polling stations to ensure the harmonious 
elevation of their elected patron Congressman Rufino Antonio 
Jnr. They secured the co-operation of the local police and armed 
forces by dressing themselves up as government Special Forces and 
it was this imposture rather than anything else which provoked 
scandal. The Comelec comments: “During all these election years, 
the dice have been loaded in favour of the affluent, the rich and- 
powerful, rather than the generality of our people . . . Indeed this 
is one of the primary causes of the youth unrest and the student 
demontrations that we witness today.”
However the students are well aware that Filipino politics simply 
reflect the underlying pattern of the society as a whole. Added 
to the normal dimensions of capitalist exploitation are a swarm 
of special tolls, tithes, protection money (known as ‘tong’) kick­
backs, and undercover payments exacted alike by the police and 
the private armies and gangs. Some of the gangs, such as Sigue- 
Sigue and OXO, are regarded by the masses as providing a measure 
of genuine protection against the brutal and arbitrary power of the 
rich. However the corruption of the social order does not alone 
explain the reverberations of the demonstrations.
The System Shaken
Two factors have combined to upset the Filipino political system 
which in its own way has worked well enough for twenty years or 
more. Firstly there is the acute economic crisis which is focussed 
on the problem of the International Monetary Fund special addi­
tional loan of $27 million. This is required to ‘roll over’ previous 
loans, that is pay the interest due on them. As a condition the 
IM F insisted in late February on a ‘floating exchange rate’ for the 
Filipino peso which has so far resulted in a 50 per cent devaluation. 
The sharp rise of living costs for the masses this entails is aggre- 
vated by the second IMF condition that there should be drastic 
cuts in Government expenditure with a consequent rise in unemploy­
ment from its present level of 17 per cent of the labour force. 
However all this does not just affect the masses (who usually suffer 
whatever happens) but it also threatens to deprive the political 
machine of its necessary lubricant. Even scraping the pork-barrel 
will not ensure the adequate flow of patronage.
The second factor to disturb the usual balance of forces is that 
in the November elections Marcos became the first Filipino Presi­
dent to be elected for a second term. The usual circulation of 
‘ins’ and ‘outs’ ensures the underlying loyalty of all to the system.
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Hence the disruptive effects of Marcos’ continued control of the 
public purse. Most powerful of the ‘outs’ is Vice President Lopez 
whose office entails only limited access to the Government machine 
and treasury. He is backed by the Sugar Block (sugar is the main 
export) and himself controls two TV channels, three radio stations 
and two of the largest newspapers. This media-barrage has been 
providing an enthusiastic chorus to the student agitations in so far 
as they are anti-Marcos. Indeed Marcos himself has tried to use the 
students and the red bogey to extract better terms in the loan 
negotiations with the United States. Police turned up thirty minutes 
too late to defend the US embassy from the ravages of the demon­
strators on February 18th.
But though, as ever, ready to turn any situation to profit Marcos 
has good reason to be most anxious about the cumulative impact of 
mounting economic crisis, embittered political rivalries, and now 
the re-emergence of a revolutionary challenge to the social order 
itself. He has himself spoken on the danger of a military coup. 
Indeed one certainly cannot discount this as a possibility though so 
far it has been held in check by the diffusion of different armed 
groups.
In addition to the private armies there is a profusion of para­
military forces loosely dependent on the State: Special Forces, 
Barrio Defence Units, Riot Squads, local police, etc. For example 
a report in the Manila Chronicle for March 1st began as follows: 
“Eleven heavily armed members of the mobile patrol division of 
the local police force raided the police department early this morn­
ing to rescue a policeman arrested for allegedly violating the anti­
graft law.” It is such incidents that give a special meaning to the 
declaration on March 1 of General Yan, the Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces: “Let me assure our people, at this stage, 
there should be no cause for alarm. The security forces of our 
government, especially those under my command, have the situation 
well under control.” (emphasis added). Even within the Army 
there are strong factions based on region (many officers come, as 
does Marcos, from Ilocos in Northern Luzon and are fiercely loyal 
to him) and also on education (between graduates of the Philippine 
Military Academy and those who entered from ordinary universities). 
A factor which so far has united the army behind Marcos is the 
support of the US military. Ninety per cent of the officers above 
the rank of captain have attended training courses in the US; 
General Yan is a Westpointer himself. So long as the US govern­
ment is prepared to tolerate Marcos he is safe from a military coup. 
Despite his talk of coups Marcos is really frightened of the people, 
nothing else.
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Despite a partial bourgeois Agrarian Reform opposition con­
tinues to smoulder in the countryside —  indeed the independent 
peasant is a more sturdy opponent of the money-lenders and tax 
officials than are the share-croppers. And now the towns and 
cities where a third of the population live have exploded.
The Left
This brings us to a discussion of the forces of the Filipino left. 
In the decade or so following the defeat of the armed uprising of 
1949-54 the revolutionary left in the Philippines 'was reduced to 
a vestigial force. The entire Politburo of the Communist Party 
was in prison and the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army, 
Luis Taruc surrendered first to the Government and later in 
prison, to the Christian Social Movement. An armed force claim­
ing to represent the Party continued to operate in two provinces 
of Central Luzon but mainly by assimilating itself to the local 
power structure and becoming increasingly like any of the other 
private armies. During this time the only opposition to imperialism 
and its attendant regime in the Philippines came from bourgeois 
nationalists like Senator Claro M. Recto. Although he died in 
1962 it was his ideas which inspired the foundation in 1964 of 
the KM (Kabataang Makabayan or Nationalist Youth) which quickly 
became a powerful force among the more than half million Filipino 
students. This organisation developed in an atmosphere in which 
the Communist Party was illegal and expression of even mildly 
socialistic views was liable to lead to summary imprisonment under 
the Anti-Subversion Law. If there were any revolutionary socialists 
in the student movement they were forced to adopt an Aesopian 
language made up of one part appeals to ‘social justice and human 
dignity’ and two parts nationalism of the Recto variety. The 
establishment of a Filipino branch of the Bertrand Russell Peace 
Foundation (BRPF) in 1965 allowed anti-imperialist sentiments to 
be more openly expressed.
Under the impact of events like the Vietnam war, the develop­
ment of guerrilla struggles in Latin America and the Cultural Revo­
lution in China the perspectives of Filipino students radicalised. 
The reflections of these struggles in the US news media, as well 
as the rise of a new left in the United States itself considerably 
contributed to this development. As a consequence of its colonial 
past and neo-colonial present English is almost as widely spoken 
as Tagalogy the national Filipino language (there are many other 
dialects in addition to Tagalog). Ironically Time and Newsweek 
reports of the Vietnam war and student struggle have done more 
to radicalise Filipino youth than Peking Review which is of course
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banned. From 1966 there was mass student agitation against 
Filipino participation in the Vietnam war and from 1968 for 
‘student power’ on the campus. In 1967 the KM split into three. 
The majority which retained the name KM were increasingly 
attracted by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as were another splinter 
group SDK (Union of Democratic Youth). The BRPF and a new 
grouping the MPKP (Free Association of Filipino Youth) drew 
closer to more orthodox ideas within the international movement.
All these groups now sought to expand their membership and 
activities outside the student sector. The KM developed worker 
and peasant sections and co-operated with NATU (National Asso­
ciation of Trade Unions) a 200,000 strong trade union group with 
considerable white collar support, which had always opposed the 
main CIA-sponsored Labour organisation. The national member­
ship of KM is now around 12,000 and includes young textile workers, 
car assembly workers and some peasants as well as students. The 
SDK which is not divided from the KM on any fundamental question 
has a membership of 1,500 mainly drawn from the universities. 
Membership of the MPKP is around 5,000 and 80 per cent of these 
are young peasants or rural workers. The MPKP co-operates with 
MAS AKA, a peasant organisation of some 45,000 members which 
is successful in the areas where the old revolutionary movement 
used to be strongest. All these forces combined to form the 
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP) in November last 
year. This umbrella organisation co-ordinated the mammoth 
demonstrations of January 26th, January 30th, February 12th, 
February 18th and February 26th. The ostensible object of the 
first demonstration held outside the Congress building on January 
26th was to discuss the forthcoming Constitutional Convention 
which it was predicted would be dominated by the vested interests 
of the prevailing order. This was. ruthlessly dispersed by the 
Manila Police despite the participation in it of moderate groups 
such as the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP).
A curious feature of the system of political violence in the 
Philippines is that it usually operates with a certain restraint in 
Manila itself where the great bulk of the middle class is to be 
found; in the rest of the country where the other 35 million Filipinos 
live it is less inhibited. The unleashing of open repression in the 
capital itself (public beatings, tear gas and then troops firing on 
crowds) helped to alienate middle class opinion from the Govern­
ment. The apparent effectiveness of the student demonstrators 
also impressed itself on less privileged social strata. Strikes broke 
out in a number of assembly plants and the jeep drivers who provide 
the city’s main transport began a campaign against the ‘tong’ which
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they have to pay to the police and the gangs. Despite the lively 
fear of further repression the M DP was able to attract over 60,000 
to a “People’s Congress” on February 12th and 18th. Attempts 
to stem this tide of demonstrations led to further clashes with the 
police in February and March in which a further four demonstrators 
were killed.
The MDP has always sought to make it clear that its target was 
the whole prevailing order and its subordination to US imperialism, 
not just the Marcos Presidency. It proclaims its ultimate goal to 
be a “National Democratic revolution” in which the broad masses 
of peasants, workers, petit-bourgeois, students and “national 
bourgeois” will combine to defeat imperialism, feudalism and 
fascism.
Inside and Ouf.ride the Institutions
It should be remembered that for a long time Filipino politics 
have been totally dominated by the violence and corruption of 
neo-colonial politicking. Even the armed class struggle of 1949-54 
was not accompanied by much mass political agitation in the towns, 
or in the islands other than Luzon. The historic significance of 
the Movement for a Democratic Philippines is that for the first 
time the Filipino people have been exposed to politics and offered 
the alternative of non-institutional political activity. So far this 
impact has been greatest in the urban areas where politics used 
to be least developed. Of course the leaders of the MDP are 
aware that theii' objectives cannot be achieved simply by demon­
strations any more than by elections. They envisage a protracted 
struggle with its main force in the countryside. It is at this stage 
that a discussion of the rival Communist Parties becomes necessary.
The New People’s Army has experimented with Vietnamese 
style tunnel warfare which provides one solution to the problem 
of the absence of cover on the Luzon plain. After the shooting 
of demonstrators on January 30th Commander Dante sent a letter 
to President saying that the New People’s Army would exact reprisals 
from senior Government agents for incidents of this type. Supplies 
entering the Clark airbase now have to arrive under heavy escort 
as a number of lorries were captured by the NPA and their contents 
distributed to the local inhabitants.
In 1967 the remnant of the illegal Communist Party split. Both 
sections repudiated the leaders of the armed force which claimed 
to be Communist. This force under the leadership of Commander 
Sumulong controls the area around the city of Angeles, right next 
to the Clark air-base. Political cover is provided by Pedr Taruc,
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nephew of Luis, who was appointed General Secretary of the Party 
in 1962 but has never convened any meeting or congress of the Party 
he claims to lead— indeed it is alleged that he is the semi-captive 
of Sumulong who otherwise operates much like any other Filipino 
warlord hiring out his “protection” to local big-wigs, suborning 
the local police, teaming up with the Nacionalistas at election time 
and drawing a ‘tong’ from everything, that moves in Angeles includ­
ing the brothels which service the US air-base. Sumulong’s men are 
now generally known as the ‘Beatles’ while the hated Government 
para-military force created to suppress them is known as the 
‘Monkees’.
]t is unlikely that any genuine Communists are still involved 
with Sumulong. In 1967 the pro-Chinese section of the Party 
succeeded in winning the support of Sumulong’s former No. 3, 
Commander Dante, a young and brilliant guerrilla leader who now 
commands the New People’s Army. Although this new Huk 
force is small, numbering not more than five hundred effectives 
at the present time, it maintains a steady pressure on landlords, 
government and local goons. Not a week passes without a report 
of some daring exploit conducted by Commander Dante’s Men —  a 
raid on the Clark base, an ambush of police, the execution of some 
detested landlord or Government agent. Most of these actions 
are concentrated in Central Luzon in the provinces of Tarlac and 
Pampanga. Less is heard of the armed force of the other Party 
which calls itself by the old Huk name, People’s Liberation Army. 
This is led by Commander Diwar and is strongest in Nueva Ecija and 
neighboring provinces. It lends muscle to the agitation of the 
peasants in these regions as well as curbing the activities of cattle- 
rustlers, bandits and government agents. The best way to esti­
mate the character of the two forces is to give an account of the 
two Parties on which they depend.
The ‘re-constructed’ Communist Party of the Philippines (Marx- 
ist-Leninist) founded on Chairman M ao’s 75th birthday, December 
26th, 1968, is led by Amado Guerrero. Filipino newspapers say 
this is the nom de guerre of Jose M aria Sison, an outstanding 
young intellectual educated at the elite Jesuit Ateneo College, 
former founder and National Chairman of KM and author of 
Struggle for National Democracy which is the bible of most young 
Filipino revolutionaries. The reconstructed CPP (M-L) was 
established after searching and uninhibited criticism of the old 
Party. It was criticised for its right opportunism in 1945 when 
it disbanded the popular Anti-Japanese Army that controlled a 
large part of Luzon; and for commandism and military adventurism 
for attempting to re-start armed struggle in 1949 without basing
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itself on the principles of people’s war. These switches were 
strongly influenced by Cominform directives: see for example the 
parallel experience of the Greek CP recounted in C. Tsoucalas 
The Greek Tragedy (Penguin). The old Party leadership was also 
criticised for violating democratic centralism and for being regarded 
as a personal property of the Lava family which supplied over 
the years four of the General Secretaries.
The CCP (M-L) accuses the Party from which it split off of 
being subordinate to bourgeois nationalism and of carrying the 
sedan chair for bourgeois personalities who do not even have any 
definite mass following. It criticises the leadership of the rival 
Party for treating the affairs of the Party as merely a side interest, 
a weekend hobby to be attended to by bourgeois academic experts 
and high bureaucrats who actually give their best hours and 
efforts in the service of the bourgeois reactionary Government. 
Finally this Party, the “heavy baggage of the Filipino liberation 
movement” has “sinister links” with revisionism internationally.
The rival Communist Party denies this and accuses the CPP 
(M-L) of applying the thought of Mao mechanically to Filipino 
conditions —  some even add "What is the thought of Mao anyway?” 
though the Education Secretary told me that Mao’s writings are 
used in the training of cadres. The Chief of Staff of the People’s 
Liberation Army told me that the CPP defines itself in fighting 
feudalism and imperialism in the Philippines and has criticisms 
of both the Russians and the Chinese on international questions. 
As an example of such criticisms he said that the Soviet Union 
emphasised peaceful co-existence too much in Khrushchev’s time and 
that China should not have boycotted the recent Moscow meeting. 
Although the CPP endorsed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia 
they generally prefer to remain agnostic on such international 
issues, saying that they feel closest to the positions of the Cubans, 
Vietnamese and Koreans.
Inasmuch as they will defend its history and past leadership the 
CPP is the most authentic continuation of the traditions of the 
old Party and in fact they inherit a significant mass peasant base 
from this source. The veteran leadership has however been 
strengthened by an infusion of young blood including some of 
the most able leaders of the student movement. It insists that the 
working class must develop its own independent organisations 
within the National United Front against feudalism and imperialism, 
and that victory will only come through armed struggle. They 
accuse the CPP (M-L) of having only obtained any influence within 
the working class by collusion with opportunist and rightist
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elements. They feel that the mass peasant base which they can ) 
still command will provide the surest base from which to relaunch 
armed struggle —  the CPP (M-L) refer to this as the “souvenir of 
a defeated struggle”.
At the moment the People’s Liberation Army is contending for 
control of Mt. Arayat, the spectacular, cloud-capped lone mountain 
which dominates the Central Luzon plain because as they say, ) 
“Whoever controls Mt. Arayat controls Luzon”. This ‘mountain 
stronghold’ approach is criticised as a militarist deviation by the i 
CPP (M-L). The polemics between the two parties have not been 
much changed by the release of the former Politburo from prison ’ 
in January this year. Though they endorse one side or the other 
they do not seem to be integrated into the organisation of either. 
Though the conflict sometimes generates a virulent sectarianism, 
so far it has probably been a positive factor in the development of 
the movement. It has ventilated many formerly taboo questions 
and it has not impeded co-operation within the mass movement. 
Indeed the present division is relatively recent and further re- | 
arrangements should not be ruled out. A leading member of 
the CPP (M-L) told me he envisaged future close collaboration of 
the youth groups of the two Parties.
Revolutionary Perspectives
On some key questions of strategy there is remarkable unanimity. 
Both for example see the ‘national bourgeoisie’ as a potential ally 
in the struggle for ‘national democracy’ though the proneness to 
vacillation of this social class is acknowledged by both. Both 
insist that the social formation prevailing in the Philippines should 
be described as ‘semi-feudal and semi-colonial’. From a scientific 
point of view it makes little sense to claim that ‘feudalism’ in any 
meaningful sense survives in the Philippines where commodity 
production and even wage labor are very prevalent in the countryside 
and are becoming more so in the wake of the bourgeois Agrarian 
Reform.
It is also very unlikely that an authentic national bourgeoisie can 
be said to exist, that is, a section of the bourgeoisie economically 
opposed to imperialism, given the latter’s long hegemony over the 
Filipino economy. Among the few enterprises to be wholly Filipino- 
owned is, for example, the Manila Hilton, and it is difficult to see 
its owners becoming even a vacillating anti-imperialist force. The 
limits of bourgeois nationalism are usually provided by its under­
lying loyalty to its own bourgeois state which in turn is usually in 
fief to imperialism. The Latin American experience suggests that 
bourgeois nationalism only allows itself to be anti-imperialist when
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the revolutionary left has been defeated (Peru, Bolivia); in other 
circumstances it is infinitely more hostile to the masses than to 
imperialism.
Do such considerations have implications for political practice? 
An increasing number of militants in both parties believe they do. 
Too much obeisance to bourgeois nationalism limits the develop­
ment of the movement. Petit-bourgeois nationalism of the sort 
represented by such leaders as Nkrumah, Soekamo and Nasser leads 
the movement to defeat because it can only manipulate the 
masses, not mobilise them for their own emancipation. If the 
working class is to become a vital force in the Philippines then 
uninhibited appeals to class struggle must be made whether this 
alarms the ‘national bourgeoisie’ or not. It is also obvious that 
national minorities like the Moslems in Mindanao cannot be 
appealed to in terms of Filipino nationalism, however radical. 
As all recognise that spreading the base of revolution outside 
Luzon is an urgent task this point is of great importance. This 
said, nobody questions that the democratic and nationalist aspira­
tions of the numerous petit-bourgeois, of many school teachers, 
lesser government bureaucrats, etc., can become a significant 
revolutionary force if it has a strong proletarian leadership.
Another question which has not been theoretically resolved is 
that of the relation between mass mobilisation and armed struggle, 
between legal and illegal work, between work in the countryside 
and work in the towns. The demonstrations of January and 
February go a long way towards indicating a practical solution 
to this. One reason the armed struggle of 1949-54 was defeated 
was the absence of any support coming from the cities. Today 
it is the Manila bourgeoisie which fears for its control of the urban 
areas. Security guards throughout Manila have now been doubled 
and many houses are up for sale in the insolently luxurious Forbes 
Park suburb with its heart shaped swimming pools and air-condi­
tioned stables. Class pride in conspicuous consumption has been 
rapidly displaced by fear.
The conquests of the ‘generation of 1970’ promise to be a 
deliverance from the long frustration of revolutionary hopes in the 
Philippines. The original feature of this movement seems to be 
that in the countryside it is learning from Mao and the Vietnamese, 
in the towns from the Black Panthers and the student movements 
of the imperialist countries themselves. However, given the quality 
of the new leaderships that have been tested in these recent 
struggles we need have no doubt that soon it will be the Filipinos 
who will be offering lessons for other revolutionaries to follow.
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Jack Blake
The Work of Lukacs
THE WORK of the Hungarian Georg Lukacs is a major contribution 
to the Marxism of this century. As an independent thinker, he 
has at various times come under fire both from fellow communists 
and from anti-communists. At the age of 85 he has just completed 
his two-volume Aesthetic, and is presently at work on his new 
book: Ontology.
Odd though it may seem some of his most important ideas have 
been attacked by Stalinist dogmatists and academic critics in the 
West on very similar grounds. Lukacs takes issue with the 
Stalin-Zhdanov notion of Marxism as a “great leap” :
T h o u g h t was arranged as if there had  been pre-M arxist thought, then  a 
huge jum p , and lo and behold Marxism was there. But the essential plus 
of Marxism is th a t it m ade everything in 2,000 years of European develop­
m ent its own — I d id  no t say this, Lenin said it.
Lukacs postulates the continuity of human culture. Marxism for 
him developed from a culture stock which had itself been revolu­
tionised by Aristotle, Epicurus, Bacon, Hobbes, Diderot, Goethe,
Jack Blake is a well-known marxist living in Sydney.
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Hegel and other creators of human culture, and Lukacs himself has 
steadfastly continued this cultural tradition of Marxism. The 
differing attitudes to his work reveal the trend to polarisation within 
Marxism today.
This is not, of course, to suggest the acceptance of Lukacs’ 
thought in all its articulations. Nor is the alternative an equally 
complete rejection; yet this dichotomous thumbs-up - thumbs-down 
response to Lukacs is frequent, and comes from surprisingly differ­
ent kinds of people. Lukacs himself leaves no doubt about where 
he stands on this matter:
I w ould be the first to protest if my views were tu rned  in to  some sort of 
official doctrine . . .  let them  recognise my position as one particu lar 
opin ion w ith in  Marxism . . . which of these theories (of Marxism) will 
prove to be satisfactory and which won't, well, none of us know of any 
criterion  to establish this o ther th an  m utua l criticism. But there  is no 
tribunal of last resort which can declare th a t X is righ t, nor can it  possibly 
exist . . . W e need sharp  discussions, discussions which have no adm inistrative 
ends.
Lukacs’ contribution is to philosophy and aesthetics, and through 
these fields to politics. It is not really useful to speculate (as do 
some of the contributors to this collection of essays) about how 
Lukacs might have developed had the Stalinist ascendancy not 
excluded him from a directly party-political career. For Lukacs, 
as a continuer of M arx’s humanism, man’s human fate, the human 
development of the personality, are central concerns in all his 
work. His Marxist humanism inevitably brought him into conflict 
with the bureaucratic dogmatists. But it would be wrong to assume 
that exclusion from direct party-political activity (apart from the 
i 919 Hungarian revolution and his role in the Imre Nagy govern­
ment of 1956) made Lukacs politically ineffective. The influence 
of his ideas is growing on a world-wide scale.
Lukacs’ work illuminates the connection between the philoso- 
phic-humanist development of aesthetic theory and politics. One 
side of the medal reveals the official doctrine of “socialist realism” 
which reduces the human dimension by subordinating art and 
literature to party-political expediency. The obverse side shows 
Lukacs’ constant preoccupation with the free and human develop­
ment of the personality, with methods which may help to arouse 
the dormant forces in each individual to fruitful activity, to the 
kind of understanding of and grappling with reality which the total 
development of the personality requires.
In this collection the essay by Istvan Meszaros, a former 
assistant of Lukacs’ and now Lecturer in Philosophy, University 
of Sussex, seeks to give a picture of Lukacs’ thought from his
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youth to his old age. Meszaros traces the main (Germanic) 
intellectual influences on Lukacs and shows that Lukacs neverthe­
less developed the most radical critique of German thought and 
literature. The notion that Lukacs, with his concern for “great 
realism”, is unable to appreciate lyric poetry, is shown to be false. 
While his contemporaries were at odds with the intricately mediated 
meaning of the symbolic poetry of the Hungarian poet Ady, whom 
they saw only as a formal-linguistic innovator, the young Lukacs 
was the first to focus attention on the organising core of this poetry: 
the elemental passion of a democratic revolutionary. In an article 
written when he was well past 80 years of age Lukacs describes Ady 
as:
the  greatest lyric poet of this age, both hum anly  and poetically. I have no
fear of being branded  a chauvinist for expressing this opinion.
Lukacs believes that literature and art are formative elements 
for the human personality, enlarging man so that he gathers the 
means to master himself and his milieu. This conviction leads him 
into an impatience with modem experimental work, and obscures 
for him the new insights, the new artistic tcols and techniques 
which have resulted from the works of the best of the moderns. 
These are matters of judgement which do not call into question the 
strengths of his aesthetic theory so much as his own use of it on 
occasions. In this he is not essentially different from other original 
thinkers who tend to see their significant new thinking as universal 
answers at last discovered.
It is mistaken to think that because Lukacs is a Marxist he 
therefore is limited to a sociological approach to the stud’y of 
literature and art; or that he has a simplistic, mechanistic theory 
of reflection. Lukacs’ aesthetic theory of realism involves his 
concept of totality —  the artistic portrayal of individual characters 
so that they embody that which is humanly and socially essential 
in the given historical epoch. This ideal of great realism Lukacs 
derives from the literature and art of three main periods — the 
classical Greek, the renaissance, and the thirty years that followed 
the French revolution. With Lukacs this does not provide an 
arbitrary prescription to be imposed by critics on works of art, it 
provides a tool which enables the critic to investigate the given 
work of art, its genesis, its human and social meanings.
For Lukacs the work of art is always a “world-in-itself” which 
becomes a ‘“world-for-us” through its evocative impact on the 
recipient: but it is able to do this only because as a “being-in-itself”, 
it carries latent within it its quality of “being,-for-us”. The artist 
does not attain objectivity by mechanically copying reality. If he 
is to attain the highest objectivity the artist has to be concentrated
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as an individual into the sole task of creation, and what is needed 
at this point is the acutest subjectivity which can chart the move­
ment in consciousness, his own and that which represents “the spirit 
of the times” . Subjectivity in this sense is not identical with that 
of the individual artist alone, but is the concentration of the sub­
jectivity of significant sections of the human species.
Every work of art, Lukacs says, is historical in its “just-so-ness” . 
Each work has its own genesis in and grows out of the everyday 
life of the given age. With Lukacs, however, the genesis itself is 
merely the indispensable condition for the understanding of art 
and literature, it is never an explanation of art or of a specific 
work of art. The work of art cannot be understood without its 
genesis, but this genesis can only be approached and uncovered 
through the particular work of art itself, and not by attempting to 
impose some external category as a label on the particular work.
The aesthetic doctrine of Northrop Frye: ‘“Literature makes 
literature which makes literature”, a prevailing academic fashion 
in the USA, occupies the opposite pole of dogmatism to the theorists 
of “socialist realism”. Lukacs’ aesthetic is directed against both. 
Susan Sontag, with her stress on the need to approach works of 
art with open senses, sensitivity and feeling, her call to us to 
experience “the luminousness of the thing-in-itself”, provides many 
stimulating insights; but her prescriptions in Against Interpretation 
would rob aesthetics of many of the toois of reason which Lukacs 
makes available. Here I do not suggest the literary historian or 
critic be an adherent of this or that theory (the history of literary 
study is also in many ways a history of intellectual and political 
fashion). What I suggest is understanding that one line of investi­
gation, pursued to its end, may produce fruitful results while in no 
way closing the field to other lines of investigation.
Meszaros sees two fatal flaws in the work of Lukacs: first what 
he describes as a dualism in his philosophical position, and second, 
a loss of mediations in his total position. The basis for the first 
flaw he finds in Lukacs’ statement that:
I come now to another basic ontological problem  of social developm ent, 
which is linked w ith the fact th a t society is an extraordinarily  complicated 
complex of complexes, in  w hich there  are two opposite poles. On the  one 
han d  there  is the  totality o f  society, which u ltim ately  determ ines the 
interactions or the individual complexes, and 011 the o ther there is the 
complex individual m an, who constitutes an irreducible m inim al unity  
w ith in  the process. In  this process, m an finally becomes m an . . .  th e  aspect 
of freedom acquires a significance which is ever greater, ever more 
comprehensive, em bracing the whole of hum anity  . . .  I assert, therefore, 
th a t however m uch all these problem s have been made possible by economic- 
factors, they can be translated  in to  reality only through m an's decisions 
between alternatives.
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Far from being dualist, this is a philosophical reflection of the 
dialectical unity and conflict at work in contemporary society. 
This position of Lukacs contrasts with the deterministic “monism” 
of Louis Althusser and similar trends in Marxism. The work of 
Lukacs is full of combat against this economic determinist reduc- 
tionism; it grows out of the real tension and conflict at the heart 
of modern society, and from this dialectical view of society it 
follows that it is real men who have to decide between real 
alternatives.
Nor can it be established that Lukacs lacks mediations. The 
argument here runs mainly on the lines of party-political mediations. 
Yet the experience of Lukacs in finding alternative forms of 
mediation is not only characteristic of him, it is a world-wide 
phenomenon of contemporary life. The increasing relevance of 
Lukacs —  an example of his relevance is, the book now under 
review —  is proof of how intellectual effort, provided it has real 
depth, integrity and persistence, finds its own mediations, or 
creates such mediations. The tendency persists of seeing the 
problem of mediations in terms of the working class as it was fifty 
years ago, but that position is being radically changed under the 
impact of the scientific— technological revolution and the consequent 
changing structure of the workforce. The humanism in the 
aesthetic developed by Lukacs has a powerful impact in the 
political sphere (even if this influence is still, so to speak, subter­
ranean). Lukacs’ stress on the role of the intellectuals, far 
from being erroneous, is timely. There is ample evidence of this 
in both the socialist and capitalist countries. In this sense the 
work of Lukacs acts against the Soviet party practice which closed 
off one channel of mediation for its own independent and creative 
intellectuals, and by doing so impoverished Soviet politics.
This collection of essays is to be welcomed because it provides 
useful information on the life-work of Lukacs and critical assess­
ments of some of his theories, but it does not succeed in giving 
a total picture of the man and his position. The eight essays 
suffer from the failings often associated with such collections: 
there is inevitably a certain arbitrariness in the division of the 
subject matter, each contributor feels obliged to elaborate his 
positive estimations and balance these with a piece of criticism. 
Apart from the somewhat piecemeal treatment of Lukacs’ work 
this also involves undue repetition. We are fortunate that in 
addition to the two further books in English on Lukacs promised 
this year, English publishers have promised to provide us with 
good translations of a number of the main works of the man himself.
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Statement for the Seventies
IN TH E FIFTIES capitalism was still able to give the illusion of 
stability, to strut as though it and its imperialist world system 
could live forever. In the sixties the illusion was shattered into 
pieces —  on the one hand by the Vietnamese people, who proved 
they could defend their revolution against the worst onslaughts of 
imperialism, and on the other hand by momentous upsurges in 
the very heart of one capitalist homeland after another.
Less than ever do socialists need any eye of faith to see that 
this outmoded system can be overthrown; the problem is rather 
to elaborate a way to do it in the shortest time and at the smallest 
cost to humanity.
It is now apparent that capitalism must regard its educational 
institutions, and in particular the universities, as permanent centres 
of disaffection and upheaval. When the revolutionary student 
movement breaks through its manufactured isolation from the 
tremendous forces of the working class, as it partially did in France 
in 1968, the shape of final catastrophe for capitalism can be clearly 
seen. Socialists thus have a special responsibility to work out an 
adequate program for their political activity in universities.
T his docum ent, in the form of prelim inary  notes, was w ritten by Or. Allan 
R oberts and others in January 1970. It la ter drew a tten tion  at Sydney 
University when it was d istribu ted  by some of those involved in the 24-hour 
occupation of the A dm inistration offices at th a t university.
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The perspective we propose here rejects the concept that the 
struggle can concern only a vanguard minority of students. Modern 
capitalism is riven by a contradiction it cannot wish away, one 
that lies at the very core of its educational policies. On the one 
hand, it is a system whose profit-seeking goals and militarist 
brutality offer people a stunted, alienated life and the threat of 
ever more horrible forms of death; thus its overall achievements 
and pattern cannot be justified by any criteria of rationality. On 
the other hand, this irrational system develops its technology in 
such a way as to need ever larger masses of highly skilled workers, 
who must be trained to the use of rational thought. It is this 
contradiction which capitalism tries to “solve” by cramping education 
into constricting channels of specialised “courses”, aimed at 
producing a chemical engineer, a market economist, even a “sociolo­
gist”, who will confine the use of his reason within such a narrow 
framework that he fulfills technological needs without scrutinising 
and condemning their context.
This contradiction did not pose a serious problem for capitalism 
as long as the cadres concerned were few in number, since they 
could be drawn mainly from a narrow upper circle and have their 
loyalty further ensured by disproportionate material rewards and 
social proximity to the ruling class. But today a numerically 
significant section of youth must be drawn into tertiary education —  
instead of the 14,236 Australian students of 1939, there will be
120,000 in 1972 —  one in every seven from their age groups.
The socialist exposure of capitalism finds a wide echo among 
this new social stratum, many of whom adopt the revolutionary 
Marxist critique and wage a conscious struggle against capitalism. 
But it has been shown that wider layers still will struggle against 
the manifestations of capitalist repression that they experience in 
their lives as students, where they are regulated at every step 
by traditional hierarchies lacking any rational justification. Because 
of the universities’ function to serve capitalist society, to contest 
this oppressive rule involves contesting its purpose and thus the 
society itself.
Rejecting at once both the concept of a closed enclave producing 
the specialists capitalism needs, and the authoritarian control 
needed to discipline them, there emerges the project of the open, 
self-managed, critical university —  the theme of the program that 
follows.
1. By 1972, one Australian in seven from the appropriate age 
group will be undergoing tertiary education. A degree or diploma 
now does: not imply automatic entry into the ruling elite, but in
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general characterises a certain kind of skilled worker with specialised 
knowledge. This applies even more strongly to graduates of the 
technical institutes or “colleges”, whose role in tertiary education 
is being consciously fostered.
2. The intense specialisation of degree or diploma courses today 
is harmful in major respects. The types of skill required for 
modem technological society are more inter-disciplinary, requiring 
attitudes of mind, particularly in teaching, research and develop­
ment, which can benefit from the achievements and methodology 
of many varied fields. Even more importantly, there can be no 
justification at our present level of technology for cramping the 
minds of increasing numbers of youth into restricted channels, to 
the neglect of their proper development as socially aware human 
beings.
At one time an argument might have been made out for such a 
mutilation of the human personality: society’s cultural development 
requires a high level of goods and services, and to maintain this 
level men must be shaped to fit the processes of production — 
however regrettable this necessity might be. But this (always dubious) 
argument lost any shred of validity long before we reached the 
present era, in which the benefits of science already achieved can 
provide the age of plenty.
Only the distortions and wasted potential inherent in the social 
system of capitalism, geared to private profit and the repression 
needed to maintain it, prevent the attainment of a fully human 
society. It is this social system, and not the requirements of 
technology, which demands that skilled workers trained to tertiary 
level should be over-specialised and under-educated.
3. The need for humanised education has important implications 
for the structure of tertiary institutions, which are today shaped 
predominantly by what is seen as their essential function: the 
production of certified specialists. It is from this ceremony of 
certification that there stems the present pre-occupation with 
examinations, as the crucial pivots around which the whole system 
revolves, along with the necessity for entrants to be subsequently 
sorted out into “passed sheep” and “failed goats” . Undoubtedly, 
a university can see certification as one of its functions (medical 
practitioners, for example) but what is quite monstrous is that the 
form and content of education —  at a level which must in the for- 
seeable future involve the bulk of the population —  should be 
deformed by this one-sided and crippling perspective.
This fetish of specialisation in turn creates the further “special­
isation” of people into such absolutely separate categories as
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“students” (here) and “workers” (there). The absoluteness of this 
division must go. On one hand, courses must be re-shaped in 
light of the educational needs of people generally, not just the 
needs of the economy for animated raw material. Increased 
flexibility and scope of courses would then allow a vast expansion 
of the university population. On the other hand, the educational 
experience of students should not be confined to the lecture room 
and laboratory, but needs to be supplemented by the irreplaceable 
education of actual social experience in productive work.
It is only in this way that the universities can transform 
themselves from the privileged enclaves that they appear to be at 
present, into valuable and valued institutions serving all the people. 
In particular, it is only genuine moves in this direction that can 
erode the real present grounds for division between the working 
class and the academic community, with all its harmful political 
and social effects, particularly on joint efforts for social change.
4. If courses are to be re-shaped to fit humanity’s needs, we must 
first recognise the extent to which they are applied to the require­
ments of capitalist society.
This adaption is most evident in the humanities, where such 
studies as politics, sociology and “economics” minimise or flatly 
omit the critical approach essential to revealing the truth about 
the society we inhabit. This evasion of critical theory is managed 
by such devices as pre-occupation with the “micro” approach, 
ignoring the framework (social and conceptual) in which the 
detailed phenomena are embedded; a crushing emphasis on positivist 
schools of thought which implicitly accept the given system and 
thus protect it from criticism; an artificial division into allegedly 
non-overlapping disciplines, so that some of the most important 
failures of capitalist society apparently disappear, being irrelevant 
to any particular single discipline (much of political economy, for 
example, can be studied in neither “politics” nor “economics”).
In the natural sciences and technologies narrow skills are incul­
cated with no attention paid to their future and application. This 
of course fits in well with capitalism’s desire for specialists who 
will serve the profit system with mutually rewarding efficiency, and 
never question the purpose or rationale of their work. To appreciate 
the dangers to humanity inherent here, we need' only recognise that 
the specialists concerned have the skills needed to devise computer 
systems for an all-embracing “security” apparatus, to design a 
city-destroying bomb, to cultivate a deadly virus, to pollute the 
environment.
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Such considerations as these emphasise the primary need for a 
struggle around the content of courses, for the incorporation of 
critical theory and socially-responsible studies. In the consideration 
of capitalist reality, and of their relation to it, the future skilled 
workers in tertiary institutes can come to see both the need to 
reject this outmoded social system, and also their common interest 
with the industrial working class in overthrowing it.
5. The special problems of tertiary institutions, not least among 
them being the necessary re-orientation towards a fully human 
education as opposed to mass production of “specialists”, cannot 
be solved by the governing bodies of Australian universities today. 
The people most entitled to tackle these questions, as well as io 
make the decisions on the everyday affairs of their own institutions 
are the staff (academic and non-academic) and students themselves. 
The representatives of “business-men” or the business man’s govern­
ments have values and interests which set them diametrically against 
any progress towards such humanist goals, and automatically exclude 
them from contributing to this re-orientation.
6. The need for university autonomy, with essentially staff/ 
student governing bodies, increases daily as the conflict sharpens 
between the needs of human education, and the narrow grasp of 
the present conservative controllers. There is a crying need for 
self-management of the university by those who work within it.
7. Autonomy of the university is a hollow phrase, unless it 
implies financial autonomy. Nor can a single university standing 
alone hope to maintain its independence. Tertiary institutions as 
a whole must be granted adequate sums, and their united demand 
for this must replace the present servile competition which atomises 
them into small, impotent units. The Budget must provide for 
an adequate living wage for all intellectual workers employed in 
their apprenticeships at universities —  i.e. for all students.
8. It must be recognised that, in any campaign for self-manage­
ment the question is one of power. It is not just that the present 
hierarchical “rulers” within the universities can be expected 
in the main to resist moves for1 a real shift in power to the staff/ 
student community. More fundamentally, a real encroachment on 
the power of the State and Federal governments is implied.
This consideration does not in any way weaken the rational 
arguments for the objectives outlined, but it does reveal as illusory 
any idea that simply the rationality of the case, once expounded, 
will ensure its general acceptance. Questions of the transfer of 
power on so important a scale are simply not decided “on the 
debate” in capitalist society. They rather hinge on the degree of
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conviction of the people seeking the change, and the extent to 
which they show themselves prepared for it.
An essential element in this preparation is contributed by such 
actions as opposition to particularly flagrant abuses of power by 
the present holders, or the claiming in practice of valid rights not 
at present accorded. It is only when seen in this context that 
“confrontation” policies can achieve a real sense of direction.
9. How should this struggle for power be conducted? It is the 
students who can be expected to take the lead. Given, for example, 
their dependence for promotion and advancement on the existing 
power structure, the academic staff in general are tied more closely 
to that structure; they are less inclined towards oppositional 
initiatives, and more inclined towards dubious compromises. 
Nevertheless, experience has shown that militant student action 
with a clear perspective can win some staff support, particularly 
from junior members.
In order to involve the mass of students and to guarantee their 
control over the conduct of the struggle, mass, meetings should 
be constantly convened in the course of the struggle.
These mass meetings can be developed as the expression of the 
students’ will in place of the Students’ Representative Councils. 
Set up as toy parliaments, the SRC’s consist of a small elite who, 
once elected, are out of the control of their electors. The student 
representatives on university senates and councils are in the 
same position. In order to put power permanently in the hands 
of those who are the members of student unions, we must work 
to abolish or transform the SRC’s and create new, independent stu­
dent unions in which all power and decision-making is placed in the 
hands of general assemblies.
It can be argued that wihile the mass meeting and the general 
asembly are democratically superior to the SRC’s, they would 
inhibit many students and staff from speaking and limit 'heir 
participation to voting. It is therefore necessary to develop 
democracy based on departments and smaller units, which will 
allow and encourage the direct, personal involvement of each 
student (and staff member) in the control of his affairs. Such small 
units would be the base of a co-ordinating, overall university 
council of student/ staff representatives. The mass meeting and 
general assembly is a bridge to this.
Out of a situation in which mass meetings or a network of elected 
departmental committee “check” the administration’s exercise of its 
power, deny it new powers, challenge and defy its decisions, and
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make demands on it, dual power will develop. Such a situation is 
unstable and cannot last for long. Sooner or later an issue will arise 
which will pose the question of which is the superior force. A con­
test of wills, a struggle for power will ensue to decide which is the 
superior. In such a situation, students and staff must be prepared 
to occupy and run the university themselves. That is the logic of 
the struggle.
The involvement of the State on the side of the administration 
is inevitable and poses the necessity for students to seek alliance 
with and aid from the working class.
10. Resistance to the demand for self-management of the staff/ 
student community can take different forms. A particularly 
dangerous response, which can be expected when the movement 
achieves success in popularisation or consequent activity, is the 
offer of some form of “co-participation”. This can vary from 
admitting a few representatives to governing bodies, to surrender 
on issues which do not vitally affect the existing power structures. 
The key words here are “the improvement of communications”, 
“consultation”, “participation” . Any such developments must be 
seen for what they are: attemDts to side-track and “buy off” the 
movement; and the need for full self-management must be empha­
sised, contrasting its implications in detail to the inadequacies of 
the sops conceded.
If, however, students or staff temporarily accept “co-participation 
schemes”, after a policy of boycott has been advocated by militants, 
it is then appropriate to convince the majority that representatives 
on the “co-participation” bodies be elected by general assemblies 
of voters, that their mandates be constantly renewable and 
revocable, that they report back to general assemblies, that 
there be no secrecy of information and meetings of “co-partici­
pation” bodies be open “to the public”, except in exceptional 
circumstances. As well, these representatives must carry demands 
from the general assembly into “co-participation” bodies. In this 
way representatives will not be cut off from those they are supposed 
to represent, will not be co-opted into the administration, and the 
“containment” purpose of these schemes can be exposed.
11. The campaign for university self-management cannot be 
properly conceived just as an isolated change in the functioning 
of capitalist society. This would envisage, in effect, the creation 
of a new kind of privileged-enclave position for academics, while 
the rest of the population remained helpless to control the most vita! 
features of their daily work and lives.
Rather, it must be seen as part of a general movement to extend
*13
the principle of self-management throughout society, the most 
important feature of which would be the development of “workers' 
control" in all work places. It is obvious that such democratic 
control can only be a farce if the owners of industry retain their 
present legal privilege to dominate and dictate to their employees. 
Thus, if it is not to be a hollow sham, a general movement for self­
management must be also a socialist movement seeking to end 
the private ownership of capital.
The opening up of universities, and their re-casting into a truly 
universal role, is of vital importance if society is to develop towards 
socialism along a path free from the domination of bureaucrats. 
For the real self-management of enterprises and the whole of society 
in conditions of advanced technology, it is essential that all workers 
have a permanent access to higher education, without suffering a 
cut-off at an arbitrary age, or upon achieving a narrow skill of 
the kind so readily outmoded by technological advance. Acquiring 
the education needed to play a competent role in self-managed 
industry must be seen as a normal part of everyone’s working 
life and paid accordingly.
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The Congress and After
Eric Aarons
THE UNUSUALLY WIDE and sustained interest in its 22nd 
Congress shows that the Communist Party of Australia still forms 
a reference Doint for the different parts of the Australian Left, 
however they assess its past, its present and its future prospects. 
Many claim that the Congress reveals the Party to be in a state of 
confusion. The planners of and participants in it would be the last 
to deny its limitations and the existence of unresolved and knotty 
problems of theory and organisation, let alone the great difficulties 
still in the way of advance and renewal. They would accept, indeed 
affirm, the description of the Congress as being a transitional one. 
Nevertheless, the main characteristic of the Congress was precisely 
that it did, within the above limits, decisively resolve on a dis­
tinctive course which has been endorsed with no little enthusiasm, 
and will be resolutely pushed ahead by a large proportion of the 
rank-and-file and by committees with a significantly lower average 
age.
It is the friendly, and not so friendly, critics who display far 
more confusion as to what the Congress actually accomplished, the 
real meaning of the strategy decided on, and the degree of commit­
ment to change in the indicated direction of the members of the 
new National Committee. Some claim the decisions represent a 
softer line, others equally vehemently see it as a harder line, while 
yet others have come u d  with profundities such as “the child may 
live or the child may die” .’ Probably the most generous non-Party 
comments were from outside Australia, a section of the British
i Sec for exam ple the concluding paragraph of Rex M ortim er's review of 
Davidson's The Communist Party of Australia, Nation,  March 21. 1970.
Eric Aarons is an editor of A l.R  and a m em ber of the N ational Com m ittee 
of the  Com m unist Party.
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Left publishing in pamphlet form the Congress documents as 
exemplifying the “exciting ideas currently circulating in the Aus­
tralian Left”.-
The main effort in the period immediately ahead will be to use 
the degree of clarity and unity of purpose achieved in the many 
practical tasks arising. Already, to a significant degree, this has 
been tested in the great Vietnam Moratorium movement, both as 
regards approach and practical participation. Thankfully, this 
movement proved to be far too big and genuine a mass movement 
for any trend to establish hegemony over it. Even the Government 
does not believe its own propaganda about communist manipula­
tion, nor could this have been effected even if desired. In fact the 
communists on principle abstained from any attempt at this and 
advocated actions and forms of organisation which hampered the 
attempts of others to that end.1 In the practical field the number 
of CP members in the localities breaking out of their previous 
isolation greatly increased, while in the factories and work places 
they were very influential in the (far too few, be it frankly said, but 
still significant) actions of support and participation.
Measures of reorganisation and changes in Tribune are already 
“in the pipeline” and will be given some practical shape at the 
National Committee meeting to be held just before this issue of 
ALR appears, while others, including the census of members and 
associated measures will take somewhat longer. All this involves 
further theoretical and practical tackling of the problem “what 
sort of organisation is most appropriate in today’s conditions”, a 
problem which was not taken very far at the Congress itself, mainly 
because significant ideas on the subject had not crystallised by 
then, but also partly because, when something began to get going 
as the Congress itself proceeded, there was insufficient flexibility 
in thought and procedures to grasp and realise some of the pos­
sibilities which presented themselves.
Any “reorganisation” will be linked up with the “opposition” 
in the Party. What will they do now? Nobody knows precisely, 
and of course the “opposition” is by no means homogeneous. But 
some aspects of the line of main leading figures is clear. Generally 
speaking they will not co-operate in carrying out the decisions of 
Congress. Some are already acting to restrict the sale of Tribune, 
collection of money, absenting themselves from discussions about
-’ T h e  B ertrand Russell Peace Foundation reproduced the "Statem ent of Ain s. 
M ethods and O rganisation” of the CPA, and “ M odern Unionism and the W ork­
ers' M ovem ent.”
•! T h e  same stand has been taken by the CPA for some tim e in regard to in te r­
national organisations.
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practical work in the industrial field, on the Moratorium, etc. This 
was quite predictable; but what will they actually do? Will they 
get out some sort of a paper (there have been rumors, and there 
has been an unnatural lull from the “Marxist Publication Centre” 
at Oyster Bay).1 Are they concentrating their forces for the next 
Congress in 1972 in the hope that the “new line” —  with some 
help from them —  will discredit itself? Perhaps; but it is hard io 
see that they could have any real expectations of succeeding in ihe 
future when they failed so signally on this occasion. Will they set 
up a new Party? De facto there is already another leading centre, 
but there are many difficulties in the way of formally completing 
the process. Some of these are practical, and these are formidable 
enough. But perhaps the greatest difficulty lies outside Australia, 
ill that such a step might take more explaining away than is con­
venient in a still tar from tranquil “international communist move­
ment”.
But in any case all the options do not lie with rabid opponents 
of the Congress, and adherents of its decisions, and many others 
who may still have considerable reservations would firmly rebuff 
splitting moves which would expose the hypocrisies of the repeated 
protestations by the main opponents of the present policy of their 
“loyalty to the Party”. There is a growing understanding of and 
support for the position taken up by Congress that:
T h e  Com m unist Party, in seeking to add to its m embers and influence, wel­
comes in to  its ranks all socialists who share its basic ideas, even though they 
may differ on some points, provided they are prepared to act in support o 
these basic ideas, and accept the  rules and constitution of the Party. These 
conditions are necessary to enable the organisation to take concerted and 
effective action, and would be impossible if differences of view were regarded 
as m ore im portan t than  un ity  ro u n d  basic ideas.
Although putting into effect Congress decisions and giving some 
reality to the desired “reorganisation” will be the focus of attention 
for some time to come, a parallel task is the giving of greater and 
wider theoretical and ideological substance to the new orientation. 
This is of course a much longer-range affair, depending more and 
more (for the Party and for everybody else on the Left) on 
conscientious and fearless re-working of the existing theoretical 
legacy and parallel integration of the mounting volume of new 
thought and scholarship now coming from Australian as well as 
overseas sources. In a period of upheaval and rapid change many 
on the Left seek to recapture or reinforce the “stability” of their 
old frameworks, perhaps revamped and made more sophisticated,
■* Just after the foregoing was w ritten  a circular appeared under the names o ' 
A. W att and E. Ross, announcing the launching of "Socialist Publications" and 
appealing for financial support to publish a newspaper, journal, pam phlets, etc.
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but such temptations to adopt a New Orthodoxy will not produce 
solutions.
In general Congress, in its preparation and level of debate as 
well as in the subjects discussed, left a lot to be desired. But 
this recognition needs to be tempered by realisation— especially 
by those who did not participate in the process and, perhaps because 
of this, display little consciousness of such an elementary fact— 
that the CPA is a real organisation with a real history made up of 
real people; that it was this organisation and these people who had 
to adopt a new course, not some other or ideal organisation (where?) 
or people (where?) who could start from the beginning again armed 
with the sum total of extant political wisdom. Thus there was critic­
ism of the fact that the meaning of being “anti-Soviet” received 
great attention in the course of preparation for Congress. But could 
it have been otherwise? And some observers who gave some recog­
nition to the historical legacy even claimed that this was the main 
framework of Congress discussion,5 though no objective perusal of 
the sum of speeches could possibly support such a contention.
In this connection too, claims that an equivocating attitude was 
taken up towards the socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in 
particular, hardly bear examination. This was in fact one of the 
liveliest debates of the Congress, and while there were different 
ideas originally as to how to arrive at the best results, none of the 
critics has made any attempt to analyse the actual resolution that 
was carried. If they still nevertheless feel that the Congress deci­
sions display a hankering for the former relations, they should at 
least note the fact that the parties and people most directly con­
cerned have, correctly, no illusions whatever on that score.
There has also been a good deal of head-shaking and tut-tutting 
over the fact that the “new course” originated from the leadership 
rather than from a rank and file revolt against the leadership. 
These remonstrations sound faintly ridiculous in view of the fact 
that on previous occasions they have been uttered over the fact that 
the leadership did not initiate moves; and more so given the changes 
in the final document, from the original draft, on the question of 
the socialist countries. Actually, of course, the leadership acted 
on the basis of its own beliefs as they had evolved as a consequence 
of past experiences, painful and otherwise, and grappling with 
the new situation. But neither were the rank-and-file passive, or 
blind acceptors in the main of the leadership’s views. On the 
contrary, the response both in voting and expression of opinion 
showed that the move was a mutual one. True, the “theoretical 
level” of the whole CPA membership —  partly a self-inflicted
•r> "W hither the Party", issued by W arren Osmond and Kelvin Rowley towards 
the end of the Congress.
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wound, this —  leaves a good deal to be desired. But an elitist esti­
mate dismissing the genuine feeling and understanding contained 
in many rank and file contributions as “blind following" is quite 
far from the truth.
The real substance of the Congress decisions however —  the 
outlining of a strategy for the achievement of socialism in modern 
Australia —  has received disappointingly scant attention. There 
has been little analysis of the validity or otherwise of the concepts 
advanced, and many critics whether friendly or hostile, or of the 
“loving-hating” variety, have taken the way of concentrating on 
such aspects as “Will they do what they say?” “Can they do what 
they say?” “What will the opposition do?” “What will the Russians 
do?” “The students won’t flock into the Party anyway, so it’s a dead 
duck”, ptc. It is not that these are not valid questions to pose, or 
that they are resented. But the issues of strategy themselves are the 
most important for serious-minded revolutionaries, and won’t go 
away even in the event that some happy pestilence (as some would 
see it) or sheer inability of communists to “measure up” were to 
obliterate the CPA today or in ten years time. It is therefore worth­
while to examine some of these issues of strategy and such com­
ments as there have been on them (not necessarily in order of 
importance).
Few seem to realise the actual significance of the debate over “the 
leading role of the Party” . In most socialist-based countries this 
“principle”, whatever its historical origins, has been a major 
ideological underpinning for the exercise of a monopoly of power and 
restrictions on democracy —  witnessed in especially sharp form in 
regard to Czechoslovakia. In countries like Australia it has been 
a major source of support for a self-imposed ghetto in which to 
one degree or another most comunists placed themselves. They felt 
internally justified or comforted on the basis that even if the 
Party’s views were not accepted now, this was more the misfortune 
or foolishness of those who rejected them, and that they would be 
vindicated in the end because people would eventually be forced by 
circumstances to conclude the communists had been always right, 
and come to them for leadership. This has been decisively rejected 
ideologically and (gradually) is being replaced in practice with the 
idea of “mixing it” with others on equal terms on the basis of 
individually and collectively making whatever contribution can be 
made in revolutionary activism and on the theoretical front, coupled 
with a real open-mindedness to the ideas of others, of being ready 
to debate and change their own ideas if rational argument and /o r 
experience point in that direction. Thus the CPA, in its thinking 
and practice is looking at itself as it is in reality in the community 
and within the Left, and is not adopting a posture of asserting a
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claim to be something it is not. There is no problem here except 
a psychological one, and any increase in following and influence 
will come naturally, on the basis of performance.
It is wryly amusing to see others now wrestling with 
this tattered “leading role” banner. In addition to the 
Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) which has been in 
this field for some time, we have the “group of revolutionary 
Marxists, supporters of the Fourth International” who have recently 
issued No. I of Socialist Review. This contains an article by Ernest 
Mandel on the Lenin Centenary, which concludes: “The future 
belongs to Leninism. That’s why it belongs to the Fourth Inter­
national” . That sort of declamation the CPA has had enough of. 
We’ll make them a present if they wish of all the old banners on 
which we have inscribed similar empty declarations. It is an 
interesting sidelight, too, that all the Australian contributors in 
Socialist Review write under pseudonyms —  the better, one sup­
poses, to exercise their “leading role”.
In related vein is the comment of another FI tendency “The 
Revolutionary Marxist Tendency” in opposition to the stand of Denis 
Freney in joining the CPA after the Congress. They say:
We consider th a t a cadre force of even as few as 500 revolutionary marxists. 
uncom prom ising towards Stalinism and reform ism  and fully com m itted to 
revolutionary strategies, tactics and m ethods of organisation, would be in ­
estim ably m ore valuable to the Australian workers than  the present CP.V\
Perhaps it would; but such pronouncements, while not perhaps 
intrinsically absurd, become so when those so declaiming have not 
“as few as 500” , but fewer than a score, and no apparent plan or 
strategy to build a party at all, nor even a formula so that one might 
choose the “right” 500.
The struggle for the “hegemony” of the ideas in which one 
believes is of course more or less inevitable and necessary, but the 
spirit in which that struggle is waged is of particular importance 
today, in view of the continuing fragmentation of the Left. The 
Congress documents say:
T h e  complexity of m odern society, the great variety of social forces entering  
011 social action, the m ultiplicity of issues m oving them , the considerable 
degree of spontaneity  displayed, and the reactions against negative experiences 
of the past, such as over-centralisation and theoretical conformity, have 
m ade it clear that organisation for social change* m ust be such as suits today’s 
conditions.
Australian comm unists advance the idea of a “ coalition of the left' for revolu­
tionary social change.-’ T h is recognises that there  are now and are likely lo 
be in the fu tu re  a num ber of trends agreeing on a general perspective of 
socialist transform ation of existing society, bnt d iffering  in im portant respects
(! International,  No. 12, p. 24.
50 A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — JU N E-JU LY. 1970
in ideology■. program  and organisation. And
Com munists seek to con tribu te  their utmost to such a leadership In their
activity, the force of their ideas, and their organisation.
Many are at pains to claim that the CPA has been of negligible 
account in the political and ideological field for at least 15 years 
(since 1956, say). If they take their own assertions seriously they 
should see that other Left groups cannot at the same time blame the 
CP for having been in a position to stop them from showing “how 
it is done” . Whether they are political parties or semi-parties such 
as the M-L’s or FI groups, those gathering around journals such 
as Outlook or Arena, or more recent organisations of the type of 
the Revolutionary Socialist Alliance, Resistance, The Queensland 
RSA, various student bodies, etc., the same sorts of questions must 
be faced. But there seems to be a marked reluctance to do so. This 
is said not as a debating point, but in earnest, because it is hard 
to see how the development of revolution can be approached 
seriously unless all ask themselves and frankly discuss why they 
have not succeeded, even if the CPA has failed.
The CPA has been accused of pre-occupation with “organisation 
building”, but its main purpose in preparation for the Congress (in 
fact since the previous Congress) has been to elaborate a strategy 
both to guide its own work and also to serve the movement as a 
whole even if only by providing a battleground on which rival strate­
gies could contend to the benefit of all. It seems rather elementary 
that one socialist strategy can be adequately assessed only by refer­
ence to an alternative strategy (supplemented, of course, by criticism 
or contrary analysis of individual aspects).
But what is the strategy of the projected FI “party” for example? 
One searches in vain for anything coherent, and the only thing that 
stands out is the continued consideration of “entrism”, but exactly 
what this involves remains unexplained, while its failure to produce 
significant results over a period of thirty years is not analysed. The 
fact that there has been some success in achieving, high positions in 
the Labor Party only pin-points the question: what is the strategy; 
what has been achieved by it; what is the perspective for future 
success; and where are the experiences illustrating its reality?
Then take the M-L’s. What precisely is their revolutionary 
strategy? They don’t proclaim one in any integrated way. They 
seem to be making something of a new turn now in practice, and 
possibly have a strategy that they prefer not to disclose, for 
some reason or other. In this connection too, while Arena, 
for example, could validly claim it is not the sort of institution that 
needs or should have a strategy, its pages have recorded, not for 
the first time, some vague sympathetic noises towards the M-L’s. 
Says Doug White of their past dogmatic and unanalytic attitudes
‘'those who formed the CPA (M /L ) have done a lot of re-thinking 
since”7. One awaits the inner evolution of this intriguing reference.
But there are a number of the new Left apparently embracing 
the idea of a “Leninist Party”, and criticising the CPA for not com­
ing up to scratch by this criterion*. But the main criticisms actually 
raised are not on the main concepts concerning strategy, but on 
other questions, including and in particular organisational ones. But 
who ever heard of a leninist party without a strategy? Or without 
that strategy, based as it must be on social conditions, being the 
key factor in determining what sort of organisation need be built? 
In earlier exchanges some of those now calling for a “Leninist Party” 
implied that a strategy was not necessary, and even that lack of one 
was a virtue. This may be a legitimate point of view, but it has to 
be argued. And even if some case is made out for this point of 
view, it is hard to embrace it in the concept Leninism, however 
defined.
To take another question; it is easy to chide the CPA with not 
attracting large numbers of new young forces, particularly students; 
but if the same criterion is applied to other definable political trends 
have they been more than marginally more successful? As indicated 
earlier, one outstanding characteristic of the new Left in Australia, 
America, Britain and elsewhere has been the fact that, beneath the 
umbrella term there exists extensive fragmentation, and there is no 
3ign yet of any reverse trend. This is worrying for the revolutionary 
movement as a whole (or should be), because as the US in particular 
shows, the great potential of revolt and the growing difficulties of 
the ruling class are to a marked degree negatived by this fragmen­
tation of the revolutionary forces. Naturally, the CPA feels keenly 
its inability to “do better” in this field. But some advance is being 
made, we are not Robinson Crusoe in experiencing such difficulties, 
and we feel that conceptions of how things might develop regarding 
the political affiliations of the students (especially) concerning both 
ourselves and others should not be too rigid or fixed in past patterns. 
Perhaps other forms may emerge in practice, given genuine appli­
cation of some of the approaches previously outlined.
Less important perhaps, but still significant, is the fact that it 
often remains more “convenient” to be a non-CP revolutionary and 
say so. And it should be clear from past experience that political,
~ From Doug W hite 's review of Alastair Davidson's Communist Party of A us­
tralia, Arena No. 21, p. 76. It would be in teresting  to know w hether this re ­
th inking involves the three fundam entals of the  M-L.'s position: (i) "Marxism 
is a set of propositions, you e ither accept them or you don 't": (ii) the first and 
fundam ental task of comm unists is to support and accept the leadership of the 
Com m unist Party of China; (iii) acceptance of "the  leader” principle locally. 
O r is it only tactical? See A I  R  No. 5, 1969, p. 25.
» Osmond & Rowley, “W hither the Party."
52 A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — JU N E-JU LY. 1970
economic and academic discrimination still finds a way even in such 
cases, and that anti-communist ideology affects adversely the Left 
as a whole, not only the Communist Party.
The attitude of the CPA to the Labor Party is another question on 
which the whole possible spectrum of positions is adopted by one or 
another trend in the Left, without any detailed attempt at either 
an over-all estimate of the Labor Party, or still less any effort to 
fit such an analysis into an over-all strategy for socialism. It is 
hard to call “a plague on the ALP” either an estimate or a strategy.0 
Ironically it is in effect a partial return to the discredited “social- 
fascist” condemnation (and a call on the CPA to abandon its now 
supposedly “soft” line to the ALP in favor of this).
Then there is the opposite reaction, of a section of the ALP Left 
and others that the Congress decisions represent a return to a 
“hard” line by the CPA. Seemingly they do not see that a greater 
emphasis on developing and expounding an independent position —  
certainly involving more consistent criticism and contest of ideas — 
does not of itself imply a turning away from co-operation where this 
is possible, or any playing down of the mass influence of the ALP 
and therefore the vital importance of the ALP to the mass movement 
and its development (or retardation). Anyone inclined to adopt such 
a view has only to review the course and success of the Vietnam 
Moratorium to find antidotes to this.
The CP attitude to the Labor Party is a complex one —  inevitably, 
one would argue, because of the complexity of the reality with 
which it deals —  and the considerations involved are set out at 
some length in the Congress document. In view of this it is depres­
sing, though not unexpected, to find that one FI “theoretician” , amid 
a whole number of quotes from the document, omits the following 
key section dealing with the question as to how the Labor Party 
could become a very important part of a future “coalition of the 
Left” .1"
Such changes in the Labor Party  cannot be expected to occur simply or 
easily. T hey would requ ire  m uch experience by Labor Party m em bers and 
supporter in political upheavals. T hey would requ ire  increased un d erstan d ­
ing by com m itted socialists w ith in  the  Labor Party organisation and sustained 
efforts by them  to expose the  contradictions of capitalist society. They 
would entail the  rejection of rightw ing views and the reform  of the party 
organisation to allow the active participation  of members, trade union 
affiliates and supporters in form ulating  and deciding policies.
A Labor Party developing in this way could become a very im portan t part 
of a fu ture  "coalition of the left” for radical social change and socialism.
» See for exam ple Doug Kirsner's speech to the Congress, Tribune,  April 8, 
1970. T h e  Queensland RSA regards both Labor Party  and trade unions as 
“enem ies”.
10 "CPA: E ither/O r" , by R. W illiam son, Socialist Review, No. 1.
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We do not suggest that here is the whole answer, but it is less than 
objective to claim that the attempt is not being made especially 
when the Congress decisions also stress that such changes in the 
ALP would need to be paralleled with a determined and sustained 
(as it will need to be) effort to change the situation in the trade 
union movement and the industrial working class.
Here again, speaking of the industrial working class one is struck 
by the variety of opinions among the Left, raising larger questions 
of strategy which it is seldom attempted to argue out. One view 
holds that theoretical considerations deriving from the progress of 
the scientific and technological revolution mean that the new strata 
will be the main actor in the future revolutionary drama. Assuming 
this could be established, what one fails to find is any treatment 
of how the industrial working class, nevertheless, is to be viewed. 
They won’t “die out”, even over many decades. Is the revolution to 
be made against them, or with their neutrality, or what? Strategy 
cannot ignore these questions, and strategy must be given effect in 
activity.1’. In the United States a section of workers have now been 
mobilised to act against the anti-war movement; here a section of 
workers acted for it. Is the one, or the other, pre-determined? Then 
one finds all sections of the FI verbalising at length about the CP’s 
present failing among the workers, and while talking about the deci­
siveness of the working class unable in practice to develop significant 
actions or connections, and explaining their (but not our) short­
comings by reference to “objective difficulties”.
It is interesting to comDare reactions about the CPA and the 
working class with that of the ruling class itself. The May issue 
of The Employers’ Review said:
Despite the fact th a t it is presently unpopular in some quarters to talk of the 
influence of comm unism  w ithin the A ustralian T rad e  U nion Movement, and 
considered by some to be inappropriate  for the present industrial situation  to 
be traced back to the influence of comm unists w ith in  trade unions, there  is, 
nevertheless, a need for thinking Australians to undertake a re appraisal of 
the  situation.
For instance, what was said and decided a t the 22nd N ational Congress of the 
Com m unist Party  of Australia over the recent Easter week-end, has a great 
deal of pertinence to every worker and em ployer in Australia — indeed to 
every m em ber of our comm unity.
Before considering an exam ination of events at the four-day long m eeting, a 
m yth m ust be disposed of. T h at is the constantly repeated "they have only 
four or five thousand m em bers (some w riters p u t the figure lower) — what 
harm  can they do?" — what harm  indeed!
It is clear to observers in industrial relations th a t a small group of de te r­
m ined flexible comm unists can cause havoc in industry.
One com m unist, working in a sensible m anner, can completely alter the 
mood and aims of a work force of about fifty w ith in  a m onth.
n  Rex M ortim er in “Student Action — O ut of N ihilism ”, A I It No. 24 recognises 
the  problem  but offers no solution in m eaningful terms.
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T h ere  are m any m ore sym pathisers w ith the aims and m ethods of the C.P.A. 
than  there  are members, and generally the C.P.A. prefers this position. A d­
ditionally, the position taken u p  by an estim ated 200,000 ex-C.P.A. m em bers 
in Australia is of im portance. Only a small fraction of th is num ber tu rn  
against the party. Some w ant m erely to be left alone; bu t the  m ajority  have 
im bibed the theories of com m unism  and still have some belief in them . 
Most of these ex-communists are just as ready for m ilitan t action as are 
C.P.A. members.
It may be expected of course that these statements contain an 
element of use of calculated anti-communist ideology. But for all 
that they show a more objective approach than by many on the Left.
Another oft-repeated criticism of the CPA’s strategy is that it is 
an eclectic one, designed moreover in an opportunist way to merely 
“gain support” by adopting others’ demands.1- The inconsistencies 
in this assertion are manifold. To mention only three: (1) the really 
eclectic position is one which has only individual points of reference 
and no developed over-all strategy —  a position which has more 
in common with the positions of its critics in the left rather than 
of the CP; (2) to demonstrate the eclectic position of a strategy 
such as the CP’s would require demonstration that the demands and 
principles it raises are internally inconsistent —  something no-one 
has even attempted to do; and (3) if the CP really were adopting 
this or that view or demand just to win favor it would be necessary 
to explain why issue is taken, as in this review, with the views of 
others, including friends.
There is no doubt that as the CPA began to listen to its critics 
and fearlessly sum up its experience it began to learn, and one 
would hope that this will continue. And there is certainly no 
shortage of critics or things to criticise or experiences to be delved 
into. But a great deal of the post-Congress criticism displays a 
degree of superficiality, and in not a few cases is, we suspect, 
dictated by preconceived attitudes, sometimes mixed with barely 
concealed personal biases and pronunciamentos. Such attitudes 
could very well do more harm to those who adopt them than to 
the CP, for everything is being tested by what actually happens—  
and what has happened in the last three years makes a good deal 
of nonsense of many previous speculations and pronouncements 
about the evolvement of the CPA. The future is complex and 
opaque, but it looks like being full of activity, change and excite­
ment —  a far more favorable and interesting prospect than for 
many a long year for revolutionaries. All attempts to unravel the 
complexities of society will be tested, not just those of the CPA. 
How we all measure u d  will determine the force of our contri­
bution.
i -  See for exam ple Doug Kirsner, AI.H  No. 23, and earlier Ann Curthoys, A I.II
The Congress and After
Dan O'Neill
IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS there will be a theoretical- 
practical crisis like nothing so far. I read an article of Robin 
Blackburn’s from the American Leviathan on the rebirth of Leninist 
strategy in European movements, etc., but I think the only way 
to keep pace both theoretically and strategically with the capitalist- 
technological concentration-acceleration, is by exactly the antithesis 
of the methodology of venerating Lenin —  even the “ real” Lenin.
What I’m waiting for is a batch of revolutionaries that prove they 
are revolutionaries in thought, word and deed, that people would be 
hard put to show weren’t revolutionaries, who read Marx and 
Lenin harder than most of their present so-called critical adherents, 
use Marx and Lenin whenever they find them relevant, and say 
screw Marx and Lenin when people try to turn them into demigods 
above history, demonic forces within history, or super-human 
embodiments of history. They were just a couple of men, intelli­
gent, mostly good, quite brave, possibly over-arrogant, and an 
important pair of contributors to one of the main traditions we now 
need to continue and transform and bring into connection with 
other traditions, such as, for example, the incredibly important one 
discerned emerging from Romanticism and a whole lot of other 
responses to the capitalist-industrial revolution giving rise to the 
notion of a common culture. In itself this whole tradition is an 
important corrective to any single class-conflict analysis, both as to 
the process of which we’re a part and the goals to which we hope 
to move, and also the strategies that will get us there.
What I’m trying to say is that we have to go on being activists, 
revolutionaries with the consciousness that the relations between 
theory and practice are possibly now specifically and irreversibly 
different from what they were. Before, marxism-leninism was the 
theory to which one converted from other traditions, if one decided 
one was going to become a revolutionary. But now the activism 
cannot, should not, will not, be contained by means of being
Dan O Neill is a lecturer in English at O ueensland Universitv and an editor 
of A I R .
5 6  A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — JU N E-JU LY, 1970
directed, even guided very much by the resources of one tradition. 
Carl Oglesby puts the point by saying that in the advanced capitalist 
West our practice is far more revolutionary than our theory, and 
that the theory (only marxism-leninism is available as a coherent 
going concern) often simply hampers the revolutionary potential of 
the practice. Another way of coming at it would be to wonder 
whether we weren’t on the verge of a period of revolution so 
profound that many western traditions, under the pressure of new 
demands for sincerity in their adherents, undergo transformation to 
the point where their categories burst and those who live in and by 
them suddenly find themselves divested of them in all but habitual 
profession, standing in a new open space of intellectual liberation, 
side by side and face to face with people from other traditions, 
people they never expected to meet there, with whom they share 
sensibilities, aspirations, currents of feeling and the deeper elements 
of the mind for which there is no tradition.
Once there was a situation where “theory-was-put-into-practice” . 
That’s still done some of the time, to good effect. But often it’s io 
bad effect. Because in some ways it’s now true that often theorising 
has the function that practice formerly had and practice has the 
function theorising formerly had. We now could work on a theory of 
theory. We could also work on a theory of strategy, for it’s not 
enough to come up with the old syllogism of cliches: the revolution­
ary theory gives rise to the revolutionary analysis— gives rise to the 
revolutionary strategy— gives rise to the revolutionary party— gives 
rise to the revolutionary tactics— gives rise to the revolutionary situa­
tion— gives rise to the revolution. It’s all too linear. We need a 
specific theory of strategy. Even if that would only show the 
problematic nature of both “theory” and “strategy” .
At present the prospect for creative “strategies” has probably 
never been brighter in Australia. The revolution seems to 
be about liberating people from what Raymond Williams call's the 
dominative mode, and there is a sort of last bastion of this deep 
in the conceptual underpinnings of those revolutionary theorists 
whose formulas, ideologies, structures and schemes, programs and 
analyses are various expressions of a profound desire to master 
and marshall the energies that are latent in the potentially revolution­
ary people. It seems to me that this dominative mode of thinking, 
feeling and willing can be operative even in the most anti-elitist 
theories and strategies. Theory needs to be seen anew as a part 
of strategy almost, namely the most articulate form taken by the 
energies liberated in people by their own dialectical interplay with 
one another in both action and discussion, in the context of their 
solidarity in the struggle against the forces repressing them, both
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the forces outside them and those they have internalised. Thus the 
groups of revolutionaries don’t gradually appropriate the “correct” 
theory and then adopt the “correct” praxis. Rather, in a whole 
process of co-operation and interaction, individuals develop both 
mutually in each other and commonly in the group the theory they 
need to understand past action and liberate further action. Then 
the action liberates further intellectual-moral energies of creative 
self-liberation and self-redefinition that we each then go on to talk 
about as our latest theoretical position. Position to blazes! Things 
are going too fast for that, and they’re too complex and subtle 
for any version of correct line on however sophisticated a level of 
abstraction. The poor bastards who can’t see that— those people 
who have the enormous pretension, based on their historical ignor­
ance, to go around regarding others as “objectively counter-revolu­
tionary”— are going to have to catch up.
I’m getting more and more annoyed by the facile escalation of 
fairly abstract internationalism along with visionary-schematic 
notions of perfectly uniform systems of soviets, workers control in 
everything everywhere, brought in as soon as the workers can have 
the word of the new correct theory and Strategy moved over their 
alienated spontaneity, etc., exorcising them from their racism, 
embourgeoisification, nationalism, etc., etc. The more grandiose 
and rhetorical all that gets the more I feel the need of something 
that’s probably anathema to the instant revolutionaries, namely a 
new kind of love of the country and the people of the country, a 
bursting out of the alienation (in the non-marxist sense) from 
everything in “square” Australia that’s almost become the bitter 
little badge by which the univei'iity leftists recognise one another, 
it seems to me we’ve been through the possibly necessary phase of 
breaking away from, repudiating a lot of the pasts out of which 
we’ve come, and it’s been painful enough for a lot of us, in terms 
of family disagreements and the rest. But that can become and 
has become a bit of a fetish. We’re fools if we think we can reject 
the past rather than totally recreate our connections with it, 
emergences from it and modes of repudiating it. The time has 
come, it seems to me, to realise the sober fact that we live and 
will live for some time in a nation-bloc, a historical nation-bloc, 
an epoch which won’t and can’t transform itself into an internation­
alist one until huge massei, of people are prepared for such new 
attitudes. They’re the people who live in country towns and 
suourbs, and in provincial mentalities wherever they live. Gramsci 
talks about “passionate bonds” and it seems to me we don’t have 
enough passionate bonds with the country or the people. We don’t 
really love the people in any tough realistic sense that can 
survive actually meeting them, arguing with them, organising with
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or against them. I’m not talking about nationalism or even about 
patriotism, but about something deep in the instinct for social 
change and in the motives for desiring social change, something that 
can’t be organised into existence, something that exists under aliena­
tion whether in the marxist or the vaguer contemporary sense, the 
sort of thing that led people to feel that Lenin was somehow very 
Russian, very much of the Russian people; that obviously permeates 
the spirit of the Cuban revolution, and Mao, and quite obviously 
the Vietnamese revolutionaries. Perhaps in countries as corrupt 
as ours and America tiling  have got to the point where the disgust 
with the so-called “representative” people and institutions is so 
profound and so subtly interpenetrated with daily life that it seeps 
into one’s feelings about the very look, smell and feel of one’s 
fellow countrymen and the countryside itself. But if go , this is a 
condition that can’t simply be accepted as the state we’re all in or 
as some kind of highly appropriate response to the situation.
The time’s come to stop using our convenient abstractions for the 
real world in either the universities or the trade union movement. 
How many of us have any real sense of the social and economic 
topography and the institutional geography of this country, the way 
a country town operates in terms of its channels of power and 
influence, the role now played by its floating “intelligentsia” of 
school-teachers, radio (or TV) young-men-going-places, reporters on 
the country newspapers, etc., different powerful social pressure 
groups, exercising power almost by default (RSL’s, etc.). Perhaps 
this kind of nation-wide infrastructure of revolution can’t be built up 
until issues actually take lots of us into the breadth and extent of 
the country. It’s an interesting difference between our student move­
ment and America’s that we didn’t begin, as they did, with some 
hard facts to digest about the attitudes of provincials (voter registra­
tion, freedom rides, lunch-counter sit-ins, community organising). 
Not that we haven’t got the sort of issues that might take us into 
the thick of that kind of thing both in the towns and in the country.
On the more specific issues concerning the CPA*; Maybe the 
major questions of strategy cut right under the present or any 
foreseeable organisation of the CPA. I think we ought all to 
restructure (and decentralise) into socialist-anarchist oriented 
nuclei in all the major matrices of the socio-economic and educa­
tional and communications centres, the role of which would be 
(i) to facilitate people’s awareness of their present condition under
* Questions posed by A L R  included: the m ain theoretical problem s for m arxists 
today; strategy, and those issues unanswered in the  CPA decisions; the concept 
of counter-hegem ony; organisation of revolutionaries in today’s conditions; 
revolutionary responses to reform ism  and the  united  front; the political 
practice of the  CPA, past, present and future; a ttitude  to the  opposition in 
the party; a ttitude  to the  USSR.
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neo-capitalist industrialised nation-blocs in an increasingly economic- 
imperialist system (ii) to educate and learn from them as to how 
to liberate ourselves from the complicated involvements we all 
have in the present set-up (iii) to make available the theoretical 
and strategic resources of the whole left tradition to contest the 
animating ideas, habits, structures, etc., of the present order.
Things of obvious importance, especially now, are topics like 
dual power, the commune, democracy, recall, counter-culture, 
counter-institutions, etc. But these should be presented to people 
with more trust for what used to be called “the spontaneity of the 
masses” . (I’m a bit unsure that “masses” is a useful concept—  
see concluding chapter of Raymond Williams Culture and Society.) 
At the very least they shouldn’t be presented, as they currently are, 
as half-understood formulae. Much of the workers’ control, self­
management stuff is being presented in an incredibly boring and 
repellantly schematic “we’ll save you with this handy ointment” 
kind of way.
I don’t know how consistent those suggestions are with the way 
the CPA now works, is organised, distributes its intelligence and 
militants, organisational skill and physical plant. Or with the rather 
odd mixture now apparently emerging of electoral-suburban and 
“interest” regional groupings. I feel as though the CPA might be 
coming up to new organisational crossroads overlaying deep 
theoretical questions going to the root of marxism. It seems to me 
that up to now most left 'strategies have been based on the premise 
of a disjunction in the revolutionary forces between an elite and 
a mass of people who don’t really have to be highly individuated 
or profoundly conscious of much more than the need to take part 
in the process leading up to and effecting “the” revolution (takes 
a number of days, weeks or months). After “the” revolution 
the leaders begin the process of making the mass into people more 
like themselves, the leaders, i.e. more individual —  by better feeding, 
housing, education and hopefully better freedom, justice, communal 
control, etc., —  till the state withers away, etc. From that position 
it was a five-finger exercise in “scientific socialism” to pick off 
the woolly-headed anarchists who thought you could ignore the 
state and over-estimate the people from very early on in the process.
I’d say the basis for that disjunction has probably already begun 
to be eroded. I don’t think there’ll be elites who have any more 
total knowledge of society than anyone else. There’ll be, if you 
like, a number of different competing kinds of “total” knowledge, 
all inadequate (both methodologically and in empirical and structural 
detail) that will only transiently and precariously define one elite 
off against another. A breath of intellectual fresh air will be enough
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to blow down the walls between them (call them factions or tenden­
cies or whatever you like) and constitute (i) a squabble if we’re 
unwise and unlucky and ungenerous or (ii) a communal heart or 
centre for a powerful revolutionary movement if we can only come 
of age conceptually. What the groups composing this centre 
(community, heart of mind and will towards permanent revolution, 
switchboard, focus, synthesis or whatever you want to conceptualise 
it as) will mainly have to offer is not the old style teaching, leading 
and master-minding element but rather a set of valuable past exper­
iences within one tradition now hopefully merging with others 
towards constant revolution (Che’s society and great school, etc.); 
these past experiences translated by much deeper reflection than 
we’ve yet made on them into usable contributions about strategy 
and tactics, particularly concerning the more traditionally political 
and social framework-type questions, including (a) how to build 
up consciousness of the straight out class-as-process and power 
elements of the preparation for decisive take-over phases in various 
areas and stages and (b) organised insurrection, non-compliance 
on a mass scale, etc.
That’s the elite side of the disjunction. The thing about the 
masses is that there now aren’t any. Except at football matches, 
in certain frenzied periods of war encounters, riots, etc. For the 
rest, there’s the many different processes of “massing” people that 
Raymond Williams has spoken of at some length in his books. (I’m 
talking about revolution in the advanced countries, of course.) 
People are reduced to “masses” for the convenience of consumer- 
individuals by the many institutions of technological-capitalism 
(and technological-bureaucratic-communism) e.g. department stores, 
industry methods of production, communications media, government 
departments and so on. If there are masses they result from the 
fact that there are powerful classes who need to limit human com­
munication and the consequent individuation in their own interests.
Likewise if there are masses they occur (in “advanced” societies) 
not in times of revolution but in times of managed social stability 
under the system that needs the revolution. The fact is, if there is 
going to be revolution, it will be made not by a crowd of foxes 
getting the horses to stampede but by a release, on a widespread 
scale, of people’s already oresent individuality, creativity, personal 
capacity for controlling their own lives, etc., developed even under 
the present system to a point that is “unmassing” more and more 
people daily. No vanguard is going to be able to pull the wool 
over these kind of people’s eyes. For one thing they’ve been 
on the sheep’s back for too long. For another, the range of 
active interests that has been politicised in a healthy and communally 
contributory way has been so enlarged that once the present
61
definers of politics and the unrepresentative institutions they’ve 
defined as politics begin to come under really immense attack, 
virtually everyone conscious and articulate in any major field of 
human endeavour will be having a say about and consequently acting 
to bring about the manifold re-definition of politics. No vanguard 
strategy, however sophisticated, will work because as soon as the 
revolutionary process begins to accelerate (perhaps this is already 
true) it will be by its very nature anti-elitist —  from the impulse 
up to the theory —  and implicitly anarchist in its every move 
towards socialism. No-one will be able to be a socialist without 
being an anarchist and no-one will be able to be an anarchist except 
in his own fantasies without being a socialist.
That brings me to the concept of counter hegemony. This is 
obviously important but insofar as it’s based on Gramsci as we’ve 
had him presented so far in Australia it’s merely sophisticated 
Leninism based on (i) illusions about the nature of interpretation 
of various kinds of interests with various kinds of ideas and with 
the socio-economic set-up, and (ii) the most incredibly naive view 
of the nature of and pursuit of intellectual life in its more intimate 
connection with people’s emotional needs and other needs for world 
views, etc., and (iii) a really impoverished notion of the speficities 
of capitalism and industrialism as huge features of concentrated 
human systemising of attitudes, processes, structures and inter­
relationships within human traditions that began before them and 
will endure after them. These traditions of human community go 
back at least as far as the agricultural revolution (as its main 
enduring substructure), and incorporate elements of feeling and 
thought that have achieved definition as “human”. They are now 
facing the more enormous task of transformation to incorporate 
industry and technology and organisation as elements of the human 
tradition rather than as obstacles to its continuance and self­
transcendence in a new renaissance of unparalleled creativity and 
humanity. We have to do a lot more thinking about Marx’s notion 
of the transforming of the world of necessity into the world of 
freedom. There are other traditions that could contribute to this 
discussion too, like the whole Christian eschatological tradition.
One final word. I think it’s not a matter of replacing “capitalist” 
ideas with “socialist” ones in minds (of workers especially). To 
amount to anything it must be more like releasing in people the 
power to unleash their self-liberative energies in their own spon- 
taneously-arising categories and ways of thinking and feeling, allow­
ing them to sophisticate themselves in the process of dialectic that 
would emerge in a movement in which there were not intellectual 
headquarters and socialist-thinker-leaders and converted disciples,
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. but rather thoroughly and constantly improving educational relation­
ships, with no roles like teachers and learners, but role-dissolving 
elements built in by the organisational demotion of any castes that 
tended to arise. Especially given castes with their implicit socially- 
conditioned over-valuation of cerebral consciousness and its modes 
, of over-understanding and over-explaining the world at the expense 
of releasing those forms of consciousness and feeling that accelerate 
- change, and those rapid qualitative intensifications of community 
that tend to break down outdated social divisions, e.g. intellectuals 
or students as against workers.
What revolutionary practice is can no longer be defined by 
I reference to any very clear revolutionary theory. The most incredible 
things (previously not even seeming to be action —  as distinct from 
what? —  contemplation, meditation, thought?) may now have revo­
lutionary implications. The whole concept of praxis needs to be re­
thought —  maybe along similar lines to Marcuse’s early assertions 
(’66 or thereabouts) that in present conditions any kind of theorising 
was potentially subversive, or Sartre’s view of literature as a 
i secondary form of action in the world, action by re-description or 
I re-definition. But not only is there no adequate revolutionary theory
> to serve as the criterion of “revolutionary this” or “counter­
revolutionary” (or “reformist”) that: there is also the need to out-
| grow our native tendency to talk as if certain issues were revolu- 
I tionary by their very nature and not others. One’s almost tempted 
to echo the piety of a bygone age and say to the revolutionary that 
all things are revolutionary.
On the organisation of revolutionaries 1 haven’t got much to offer 
|’ apart from all the implications of the above except to suggest that
> organisation should more and more be deliberately conceived as 
probably a temporary adjustment to a fast changing set-up, and it 
should be underpinned by an acceptance of the principle that the 
movement is more important than any of its organisations and that 
its least important organisations are those that identify themselves
f too readily with the movement and the movement too readily with 
themselves. A function of the above is the proposition that the 
’ theory of an organisation is not something to which all its members 
subscribe. The theory of an organisation is the foliage, or rather 
part of the foliage, not the root. I could conceive of an organisation 
producing a dozen manifestoes, rather than one that took months 
of re-hashing, haggling, increasingly uncreative concession and 
,, counter-concession to produce. That seems to me to be the same 
kind of choice of creativity or conformity that we’re saying should 
be made in so many other fields. Why preserve conformist ways 
of saying “don’t be conformist” or routine ways of organising for a 
spontaneous society?
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Don’t waste time attacking reformism, except at times of crisis 
and needful choice. Rather invade intellectually and practically 
the areas of social theory and action wtjere reformist theorists j 
now hold almost undisputed sway, and integrate those concerns 
with concerns already included in revolutionary perspectives. ] ; 
mean things like housing, underprivilege, education, local govern- ' 
ment, urban problems, etc., etc. Snedden’s new ACTU approved 
anti-strike procedures, all the areas where the creative thinking is 
now being done mainly by people like Gough Whitlam and Bob 
Hawke. 1
On the united iront and lowest common denominator politics, ! 
I think they should be eschewed if it means any form of soft- I 
pedalling or disguise or manipulation. But I think a lot of naive | 
bullshit is talked about ventures misdescribed in those ways by 
left-left-leftists (or fools as they used to be called). I mean 
ventures in which any numbers of different kinds of people are 
involved and in which revolutionaries too could be involved, raising 
explicitly and publicly, undisguised, the question of the need for i 
revolution and the connection of the issues at hand to revolution.
The CPA’s future possibilities seem to me to depend on looking 
at the advantages it has:
1. Australian idiomatic presence and history within the life of 
this country since the 20’s.
2. Rootedness in the trade unions and economic life generally.
3. Good regional and cross-institutional link-up, especially the 
urban-country spread.
4. Tribune has the makings of a focus of revolutionary agitation, 
publicity, organisation across the country.
5. Experienced militants and theorists capable of contributing to 
the emergence of a new and qualitatively superior synthesis 
and dialectic with the new revolutionary forces. But you may 
have to go deeper down and further out than many of you seem 
at present to anticipate. You may have to go further than 
being the most open Communist Party in the international 
movement and become the most open ex-party or something 
likely to risk being called that by the rest of the international 
movement.
I can see how loath to risk the secular equivalent of schism 
or heresy many may be, but it may even within the “liberal” or 
“revolutionary” communist international get to the hard choice 
between principle or convenience of remaining within some
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sort of “family’ or even a very hard strategic choice that 
would split the party again, giving rise to a new grouping that 
doesn’t care much whether it’s called communist or not. But, 
of course, this is all a bit speculative.
6. The best physical plant and with it the kind of natural “home 
of the homeless left” authoritativeness that everyone’s almost 
constitutive materialism even on the “idealistic” left gives to it.
After looking at these advantages I think you ought to decide 
how to re-arrange them, starting without certain preconceptions 
that seem up to now to have inhibited the reform of the party, 
including belief in the need for a party, however newly defined. 1 
can see, however, that decisions as radical as some on the rearrange­
ment might be, might possibly have to await further clarification 
of the nature, strength and permanence of the non-CPA revolution­
ary and radical movement in Australia.
Attitude to CPA’s present opposition: “ I’d say let the thousand 
flowers bloom. In which I’d include things like the majority of the 
party (the “goodies”) talking to the many other left groups in the 
country and the real concerns of the living movement far more than 
to the dissident one-third. I wouldn’t rule out public and vigorous 
disagreement on principles, strategy and tactics by the majority 
liners and the minority liners before any and every kind of audience, 
including the press, the university campuses, the high schools (ha 
ha), but most importantly the man on the job and the rank-and-filers 
in the trade unions. Screw unity based on anything but (at the least) 
fundamental humanist and libertarian socialist assumptions and 
the ability to stomach one another’s attitudes to the human spirit. 
As embodied in the Vietnamese people and the Czechoslovaks.
If the majority of the party is going to use its power against 
the minority let them use it to  determine the issues to be debated 
and the people to debate them with, not to machine-politik the 
minority into an insignificance that will produce a set of emotional 
cross-currents sucking the party back down into the swamp of 
ideological-rationalising infighting and vindictiveness. Surely the 
whole exercise has not been to produce a majority saying the righi 
things in an Aaronite chorus, but rather to facilitate talking about 
and organising around the issues of the 70’s rather than the non­
issues of the economic-determinist non-history or the pseudo issues 
of the exhumed 30’s. Let the dead bury their dead and talk to 
the living (or at least half-living) movement.
As for the USSR, I hope they get to the moon, especially the 
bureaucrats.
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Interview with Markos Dragoumis
ALR: On April 21, 1967, a military coup took place in your 
country. Did the coup really come as a surprise to the left
DRAGOUMIS: This particular coup by this particular junta at 
this particular time came as a surprise to everybody except those 
who took part in it. We on the left had always subscribed to 
the theory that if a coup were to take place in Greece —  and we 
had repeatedly stressed this possibility —  it would come as direct 
result of the combined actions of the King, the traditional right 
who are organised in the National Radical Union (ERE) and 
the representatives of US imperialism.
A fortnight before the coup we concluded that two of the main 
pillars of reaction within Greece had opted for a “parliamentary" 
solution of the crisis. The King had agreed to elections and 
appointed the leader of the right, Kanellopoulos, as Prime Minister 
to organise them. We had also assumed that the Americans would 
think twice before risking, a coup at a time when their Vietnam 
policies were under heavy fire both in Europe and at home. 
What we feared was a repetition, on a grand scale, of the rigged 
elections of 1961 with the Army and the police securing a safe 
majority for the right. In the event, the coup took everyone by 
surprise, including the King and Mr. Kanellopoulos who was 
among the first to be arrested. Over-simplified analyses and 
failure to study the very structure of the various forces threatening 
democracy in Greece led us into error. Circumstantial evidence 
about American involvement and! fore-knowledge of the coup 
included, for instance, the advice to families of American diplo­
matic and the military personnel in Athens not to leave their 
homes and go out in the streets on the night of April 21. However 
one does not need to rely on this kind of evidence to ascertain 
the American involvement. The junta relies on the Pentagon and 
the NATO military command for their military aid and support 
and the American 6th Fleet pays regular visits to Greek ports.
Dr. Markos Dragoum is is a prom inent m em ber of the (.reek Patriotic Front 
(PAM).
He recently visited A ustralia seeking m oral and financial support for the struggle 
of the  Greek people against the m ilitary ju n ta , and just before he left gave this 
interview to A L R .
A form er m em ber of parliam ent, he has been an activist since his student days, 
and was in te rned  for a year in 1955 in a political prisoners' camp.
He was abroad when the ju n ta  seized power on Julv  21, 1967.
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ALR: It has been said that the leadership of the Greek Communist 
Party abroad has warned communists in Greece about the imm'n- 
ence of a coup and that these warnings were disregarded. Is this 
true?
D: No it is not. Wc have heard the story and we have asked for 
concrete evidence which has not been provided. When was this 
warning issued? Why did this leadership not make the warning 
public? In fact the General Secretary of the Party, Kolliyannis, 
in his closing speech at the 10th Plenum, held a few months before 
the coup, did not even mention the possibility let alone give 
directives as to how such a coup was to be faced by the Party. 
Let us face the truth: Nobody expected this coup at the time 
it occurred. As for the leadership of the CP, they were mainly 
preoccupied with the problem of the legalisation of the Party, 
not with taking measures to avert an imminent coup.
A.L.R.: Isn’t it true however that a coup was always possible, even 
probable, in Greece and that the left ought to have had some 
contingency plan to face it in case it happened?
D: This is true of course. I will try to explain what happened. 
It should be clear that we are discussing the unpreparedness of 
the left to face a coup, not necessarily its possibility to avert it. 
To believe that the left could have averted any coup at any time 
is a case of wishful thinking; but to believe that with proper 
contingency planning it could have avoided being caught unawares 
is, I think, more realistic. Our unpreparedness can be ascribed 
to the following main causes:
First the leadership of the CP had, after the events of summer 
1965 (i.e. the dismissal of the lawfully elected Prime Minister 
George Papandreou which produced mass demonstrations and even 
a general political strike) under-estimated the determination of 
US ruling circles to clear up the situation by any means. On the 
other hand the leadership overestimated the effectiveness of mass 
political struggles and their potency against an enemy who con­
trolled the Army and the police.
Second the peaceful road to socialism was interpreted by the 
leadership of the CP in the narrowest possible sense leading 
to a series of legalistic errors in estimating the enemy’s intentions. 
In a country where a dynamic democratic movement has been so 
long contained by police persecution, intimidation and political 
manipulation, the normal functioning of political democracy (even 
distorted, even impeded by the exceptional laws of the period ol 
the civil war) was a danger in itself for the powers that be, and 
a democratic majority emerging through elections might have ended
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the police state and taken the country towards more and more 
advanced forms of democracy and independence. Moreover, after 
the elections of the 29th of May —  which never took place —  it 
would have been more difficult to organise coups since one of the 
issues of the elections was to bring the army under civilian control 
and stop the King’s interference in politics. In such a situation 
the blind insistence of the left on playing the game of peaceful 
evolution without considering that the enemy might at some stage 
stop the game by force, was an error.
These are the reasons why the preparations for an eventual 
coup were completely disregarded. Whatever communist organi­
sations there were before the coup in Greece were not involved 
in planning action in case of a coup, not even securing printing 
facilities or a network of emergency hideouts for those militants 
who might have to go underground. I would like to stress here 
that the problem is not whether or not there were too few 
communist cells in Greece but what they were supposed to be doing. 
Those cells that existed were certainly not prepared to take over 
an underground struggle if the legal party of the left, EDA, were 
to be dissolved and its leaders arrested. It is indicative that the 
then leadership of the CP decided to reconstitute its party organi­
sations in Greece in 1965, 7 years after having dissolved them in 
1958. This decision of the 8th plenum in 1965 was taken because 
the CP felt conditions were ripening for it to become a legal party 
following the defeat of the right at the elections of 1964. The estab­
lishment of CP cells within the organisations of EDA was a sort of 
semi-legality for the party even though this meant that the cells were 
not much more than discussion grouos. It can be argued that 
the creation of cells, completely independent of EDA, having as 
their primary concern the preparation for a coup and manned 
by communists relatively unknown to the police who would 
operate in strict secrecy as if the dictatorship was already estab­
lished, could have had very beneficial effects, but this did not 
happen. When the coup came the underground organisation had 
to be built from scratch by the very communists who were the 
leaders of EDA.
These facts are not contested even by the Kolliyannis group who 
call themselves the leadership of the CP today.
ALR: How has this split in the Greek CP come about?
D: Immediately after the coup the members of the Central 
Committee of the CP within Greece went underground. Under 
the guidance of the Bureau of the Interior, that is the four member 
body which was in charge of the work of the party within Greece 
before the coup, they started organising the resistance against the
(58 A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — JU N E-JU LY. 1970
junta. Nine days after the coup the “ Patriotic Front” was formed 
by Mikis Theodorakis, Andonis Brillakis (a member of the Bureau 
of the Interior), youth leaders and others not belonging to the left.
Almost three months after the coup the 1 1th Plenum took place 
abroad without the participation of, contact with or the knowledge 
of the members of the CC working inside Greece. As soon as 
contact was established the Bureau of the Interior sent a message 
to the leaders outside Greece which in essence said that discussion 
of the main problems facing the party should include them. They 
stated that it was a mistake to hold the 11th Plenum without 
them. While this plenum had simply opened the discussion the 
next would analyse the situation, call for the convening of a 
“ representative body” (possibly a conference since a congress was 
difficult under the circumstances) and decide upon the responsi­
bilities for the past, the line of the party, its alliances, the forms 
of struggle and the organisational structure. It was essential that 
members from within Greece should take part in this.
Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, in February 1968 the members 
of the CC in Greece heard over the radio that the 12th Plenum 
had been convened and at the suggestion of the General Secretary, 
Kolliyannis, and that the four members of the Politbureau who 
were present had demoted the other three and that this decision 
was ratified by the votes of twelve full members of the CC abroad 
against nine full members opposed. Very serious accusations of 
“right wing opportunism”, “factionalism”, etc., were made against 
the dissidents. Such a serious vote was close enough but taking 
into account the alternate members of the CC there were actually 
19 in favor and 19 against. Even more serious was the fact that 
a number of new members totally in support of Kolliyannis were 
then coopted both to the CC and the Politbureau.
The comrades of the Interior (whose number when added to 
the dissenters abroad placed Kolliyannis automatically in a minority) 
chose to resist this coup within the party. They suggested a new 
plenum, and suggested that the 12th Plenum should be considered 
as having never happened. They asked for a new plenum with 
the composition of the CC as it was before the 12th Plenum. This 
demand was rejected by Kolliyannis time and time again. When 
comrade Brillakis, representing the Interior, came out of Greece 
in June 1968 he was told by Kolliyannis that the validity of the 
12th Plenum was to be the starting point for any discussions. 
Brillakis, representing the Interior, refused this.
From then on the split deepened and crystallised. The Kolli­
yannis group used all the means at their disposal to attack opponents 
within the Party. First they “purged” the party in a most unortho­
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dox way. The criterion of whether or not someone was to be 
regarded as a party member was his acceptance of the validity 
of the 12th Plenum. Those questioning it were left out, not 
always expelled but simply barred from taking part in any of its 
organisations. In the EDA organisation abroad wherever the 
Kolliyannis group was in a minority they set up a parallel organi­
sation. They did this quite recently in the “Patriotic Front” (PAM). 
First they announced the appointment of Tony Ambatiellos as the 
representative of PAM and maintained this despite the fact that 
the National Council of PAM made it quite clear in their under­
ground paper Nea Hellada that the Front was represented abroad 
by Brillakis. Then desperate because the communists inside 
Greece, within the Front, did not recognise their action they set 
up a new body which they called “Central Committee of the 
Patriotic Front” . They have attacked by all the means put at their 
disposal by various socialist countries, leaders such as Glezos — 
our national resistance hero —  and more recently Mikis Theodora- 
kis.
ALR: Is it true (hat they are a majority as they claim?
D: In a way they are more than that. They are the totality, 
the absolute unanimity, because their argument has become entirely 
circular. If a communist must accept the 12th Plenum then 
there are n» communists opposing it any more. The truth of 
the matter is that amongst those who were members of the party 
before the 12th Plenum something like 25r<30% have stayed 
with the Kolliyannis group. The CPSU supports the Kolliyannis 
group of course. But this fact cannot guarantee a significant part 
in the resistance. This requires the loyalty and dedication of 
Greek communists.
ALR: Have the differences between the communists inside Greece 
and those abroad been on matters of procedure all along?
D: No. But the demand for respect of the rules and the consti­
tution of the party was decisive after the 12th Plenum. As things 
stand now the majority of the CC represented by leaders of 
the Interior plus “dissenters” abroad have the following differences 
with the Kolliyannis group. First democracy within the party. 
Democracy becomes a weapon in the struggle only if those in 
the struggle who risk torture, or life imprisonment, have the 
confidence that their opinions and views will be taken into account. 
Democratic procedure is not a luxury for easy periods. It is a 
method for the party to assimilate the wisdom and the inventiveness 
of all the militants. It is the only way that the party can become 
a “collective intellectual” as Gramsci put it.
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Second, autonomy of the Greek CP. This must not be confined 
to lip service. Thus, for example, the CP regretted the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia while Kolliyannis hailed it as a success against 
“right wing opportunism”, and the CP criticised the trade agree­
ments of certain socialist countries with the junta. Autonomy 
cannot mean blind faith that the parties of some socialist countries, 
particularly the CPSU, are always right.
Third, the principle that what is to be done in Greece must be 
decided there. The CP has established the pre-eminence of the 
Interior, of the leadership inside the country. Not all its leaders 
are in Greece all of the time but the decisions are not imposed 
from without. The Kolliyannis group is out of touch with Greece. 
This has been the main reason why it has had so little success 
in co-operating with any other non-communist anti-junta forces 
within Greece or abroad. On the contrary it has attacked viciously 
Andonis Brillakis for the agreements he signed with Prof. Andreas 
Papandreou, leader of PAK, and with the “Democratic Defence”, 
that is with two main resistance organisations which are fighting 
within Greece. The Kolliyannis group cannot accept that the 
Greeks who resist have coordinated their action without it. Seeking 
to find something objectionable in these agreements a very big 
lie is propagated, namely that the resistance organisations have 
not included in their program the abolition of the anti-constitutional 
laws of the civil war banning the CP. All those who bothered to 
actually read the agreements know that this is not true but it is 
being repeated by radio stations broadcasting from six socialist 
countries, and by the Kolliyannis Voice of Truth as well.
Last but not least, I would like to mention that the Kolliyannis 
group accuse the Communist Party of having become a loose 
party of the social-democratic variety. This is an even bigger 
lie. The communists inside Greece have organisations which have 
not been damaged by the enemy. They have proved to be effi­
cient organisers an4 have in their ranks the most experienced 
and ablest underground workers. Moreover, the Communist Party 
has made it quite plain that it advocates active resistance in all 
forms, including violent action to the extent that it has been 
used till now (bomb explosions and violence against property) 
because this keeps the junta on its toes and increases its persecution 
complex. The Kolliyannis group disapproves of these activities.
In conclusion I would express the view that despite the diffi­
culties caused by the split, the CP is being strengthened because 
it is seeking its own national way towards advanced democracy 
and socialism, and overcoming the dogmas, the authoritarian methods 
and the prehistoric bureaucracy which in conjunction with its lack 
of autonomy have harmed it so much in the past.
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Discussion:
Towards Scientific Humanist Socialism
A L T H O U G H  — or perhaps because 
— I am a professional scientist, 1 can­
not entirely agree with Robin Black­
burn  (A l . l i  Apr.-May 1970) about "the  
debate between those seeing socialism 
in the hum anist way and those seeing 
scientific socialism."
Science is concerned solely with as­
certainable facts and dem onstrable 
causal relationships, and is totally 
irrelevant to value judgements. A 
scientific approach is therefore quite  
indispensable when we are concerned 
with the best way to achieve a given 
end, bu t it can tell us absolutely 
noth ing about w hether that end is 
worth achieving.
Of w hat use is it to prove scientifi­
cally th a t “socialism is the form of 
society th a t resolves the contradictions 
of capitalist society”, if most of the 
people of the capitalist countries re ­
tort, "Yes, bu t we prefer the con tra­
dictions of capitalism ”? We could p e r­
haps go 011 to prove that socialism will 
raise the living standards of the over­
whelming m ajority  of hum anity, but 
the upholder of capitalism  replies, 
"M aybe, bu t I'm  too busy looking 
after num ber one to worry about 
o ther people’s bad luck." So the a rgu ­
m ent could go on. until, to avoid an 
infin ite  regress, we must eventually 
fall back upon some such grossly u n ­
scientific bu t therefore unanswerable 
argum ent as " th a t's  the  way all decent 
people feel it ought to be." This, 
however, is obviously qu ite  futile u n ­
less we can persuade our in terlocutor 
to accept our standards of decency,
and this, of course, involves a moral 
ra th e r than  a scientific judgem ent.
W hen A ttorney-General Hughes 
alleges th a t the organisers o; the 
V ietnam  M oratorium  Campaign cannot 
completely control all the participants, 
and th a t the  Campaign is likely to 
lead to "actions repugnant to all de­
cent A ustralians”, thereby implying 
th a t he and his fellow-warmongers are 
in com plete control of the actions of 
their hirelings and conscripts in V iet­
nam , and th a t the massacres, the rapes 
and m utilations and tortures, the lay­
ing waste of the  people's homes and 
countryside, arc being carried out with 
his connivance, and arc not repugnant 
to decent Australians, We can dem on­
strate  no scientific fallacy in his a rgu ­
m ent; we can only poin t out its moral 
im plications, and hope th a t Australians 
who are “decent" by Mr. H ughes’ stan­
dards are in an insignificant m inority.
W hen External Affairs M inister Mc­
M ahon threatened th a t the Vietnam 
M oratorium  Campaign m ight lead to 
the same kind of tragic results as 
the  peace dem onstration by University 
students at Kent, Ohio, a few days 
earlier, he was using a scientifically 
valid m ethod of discouraging some 
people from taking part in the C am ­
paign. He could, of course, have 
equally scientifically guarded against 
such a tragedy by guaranteeing that 
arm ed troops and police would not be 
used against the  Campaign. T h e  cor­
rectness or otherwise of his choice 
can be judged only in m oral and 
hum anist, not scientific terms.
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It has been proved scientifically that, 
if pollution and despoliation of the 
earth and its air and water continue 
unchecked at the present ra te , ou r 
planet will be literally unfit for 
hum an hab ita tion  by about the  end 
of this century, and the hum an race, 
along with most o ther higher forms 
ol terrestrial life, will be set irrever­
sibly on an unspeakably m iserable road 
to rapid  extinction. If, however, some 
business tycoon or T ory politician 
likes to say, “Yes, that is im portan t, 
but not as im portant as an uinpteen- 
billion-dollar industry,” we cannot 
prove scientifically that he is wrong, 
ll is, after all, neither more nor less 
scientific to use science for the purpose 
of m urdering  one's children for one s 
own enrichm ent (provided one can 
get away with it) than  to use it to 
build a better world for one's ch ild ­
ren, bu t nearly everyone who is neither 
a business tycoon nor a T ory politician 
would agree th a t it is im m oral and 
inhum an.
It follows from all this that, to have 
any social and political relevance, 
socialism m ust be both scientific and 
hun anist: scientific in its choice o? 
means, hum anist in its choice of ends.
T he supposed irreconcilable d icho­
tomy between science and hum anism , 
reason and emotion, knowledge and 
feeling, th a t has bedevilled m uch 
inarxist thought for nearly half a 
century is, in fact, the product of an 
undialectical in terpreta tion  of M arx's 
theories. R obin Blackburn justifiably 
refers to ‘‘the m arxist concept of a 
hum an na ture  to a great extent h is­
torically determ ined ", but, like m any 
people before him , argues from this 
as though "to a great ex ten t" were 
synonymous with “entirely". In te rp re t­
ed in this way, the “concept'’ is dem on­
strably false, and therefore unscientific 
and unm arxist.
T h e  new-born hum an in fan t is not 
an undifferentiated lum p of p ro to ­
plasm, passively w aiting like wet clay 
to be m oulded in to  w hatever form its 
environm ent imposes upon it, b u t a 
highly complex organism , every de­
tail of whose structure  plays a p a r t in 
determ ining how it will react to a 
given environm ent, just as surely as 
its environm ent determ ines in which 
o . innum erable possible ways it will 
develop. In short, no hum an being is 
lorm ed solely by his environm ent nor 
by heredity, nor is he a chim aera ol 
environm ental and hereditary factors, 
bu t the product of continuous complex 
dialectical interaction between the 
genotype and the total environm ent 
(in which, of course, social and his­
torical lactors pay a m ajor bu t not 
an exclusive role).
T h e  contrary view, often erroneously 
a ttrib u ted  to Marx by friend and  foe 
alike, leads to such absurdities as 
the  ludicrous pseudo-m arxist idealised 
concept of capitalist society as made 
up of a proletariat consisting entirely 
of determ ined, class-conscious revolu­
tionaries (forgetting that right-w ing 
tiadc  union bureaucrats and renegade 
politicians and their supporters, scabs 
and blacklegs, even storm -troopers, are 
usua’ly of working-class origin, not to 
m ention the late ex-house pain ter 
Adolf Schicklegruber. alias H itler), an 
idiotic m iddle class universally incap­
able of original though t or determ ined 
action (forgetting th a t A braham  L in ­
coln, Lenin, and Marx himself, were 
m iddle class intellectuals), and a ru th ­
less, m onolithic bourgeoisie (forgetting 
that Engels, R obert Owen, and Wil- 
berforce of anti-slavery fame, were 
capitalists).*
* T o forestall charges of "revision­
ism”, I m ust emphasise th a t I am not 
trying to refute M arx's theories on the 
historic roles of the classes, bu t only 
the ultra-m arxist, super-proletarian 
view th a t all the characteristics of 
every individual are solely and com ­
pletely determ ined by his class origin.
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W ithout denying that accepted moral 
standards tend to differ between d if­
ferent societies, and between different 
classes w ith in  the  same society, every­
one who relies on his own observations 
ra ther than  on some accepted dogma 
m ust adm it that individuals vary wide­
ly even w ithin the same class in the 
same society, that we all know in ­
dividuals whose a ttitudes to some 
m atters are qu ite  inappropriate  to 
their class origin and even to their 
epoch, while, on the o ther hand, there 
are certain  basic a ttitudes that seem 
to be common at least to those gener­
ally regarded as the  most advanced 
thinkers in every age. Every one of 
the world's great religions, for in ­
stance. preaches the Golden Rule in 
one form or another, though they 
originated in different m illennia and 
in societies in widely differing stages 
of developm ent. It is also significant 
that identical twins nearly always show 
rem arkable sim ilarities in their m en­
tal and em otional attitudes, even when 
separated at b irth  and reared in quite  
d ifferent environm ents, while, on the 
o ther hand, infant anthropoid  apes 
never develop m ore than  a superficial 
resem blance to hum an beings, even 
when reared as hum an babies. Any 
social theory that fails to explain all 
these facts is ipso facto unscientific, 
and therefore uninarxist.
BASIC HUMANISM 
UNIVERSAL M ORALITY
It seems, then, that there is a 
definable "basic hum anism " or "u n i­
versal m orality", despite the widely 
different ways in which it manifests 
itself in different societies, different 
classes and different individuals. This, 
however, does not necessitate the 
adoption of any kind of idealism or 
supernaturalism , nor of "some ideology 
of supra-hijtorical hum an na ture  ", but 
can be explained in purely scientific 
and m aterialist terms.
N early everyone nowadays k n o w s 
som ething about Darwin's theory o f 
the  “survival of the fittest", bu t it is 
not always appreciated that "fitness' 
in the  Darw inian sense has little  in 
common with the sense in which the 
word is used by sportsm en and physical 
tra in ing  instructors, or in such ver­
nacular expressions as "you’re not l ii 
to lick his boots". It refers simply to 
the fittest to survive genetically, o r, 
m ore precisely, to the possession ot 
hereditary  traits that can be passed 
on to the m axim um  num ber of viable 
offspring. T h e  organism that l iu s  to 
a healthy and contented old age and 
then dies peacefully with 110 descen­
d an ts to m ourn his passing, is much 
less "fit"  in the Darwinian sense than 
one who lives a short bu t hectic lile. 
leaving behind num erous offspring 
to transm it his genes to generations 
yet unborn . It follows that an in ­
d ividual prepared  to risk his life 
for his offspring may be fitter to 
survive than  one m otivated solvely by 
instincts of self-preservation.
Similarly, when anim als band to ­
gether for w arm th or protection against 
predators, the fittest herd may be 
the one with most members prepared 
to subordinate their individual in te r­
ests to the good of the herd. In this 
way, gregarious and altruistic instincts 
lend to be favoured at the expense 
of instincts of self-preservation, a l­
though the latter, of course, can never 
be completely elim inated. Every species 
has achieved its own equilibrium  be­
tween those instincts and o ther traits 
th a t fit the individual for com peti­
tion with others of its own species, 
and those which fit it for co-opera­
tion in the preservation of the 
species. T h e  fossil record shows, how­
ever, th a t when the form er become 
very highly developed at the expense 
of the  la tter (as in the dinosaurs of 
about sixty m illion years ago, and 
in the great cats and some o ther large 
anim als of present and recent times)
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the species is on the verge of ex tinc­
tion.*
Man, of course, as the  most social of 
all anim als (with the possible excep­
tion of the  ants, bees and term ites, 
whose rigid, hierarchical social struc­
ture would hardly be envied even by 
fascists and tories, since it provides 
no privileges for parasites), has the 
most highly developed altru istic  in ­
stincts. Moreover, w ith increasing 
complexity of social organisation, his 
social loyalties have tended to extend 
from the family to the horde, to the 
clan, the tribe, the nation, and finally 
to the whole species. It is therefore no 
accident or miracle th a t w hat is com ­
mon to all the  great religions and all 
ethical codes that have won broad 
acceptance th roughout the ages, is an 
emphasis on the sacredness of life, and 
of hum an life in particular, and on 
m an's du ty  to his neighbour, on the 
brotherhood of man.
It is  p r e c is e ly  th is  c o m m o n  h u m a n  
h e r ita g e  w h ic h  d e te rm in e s  th a t  a ll  m en  
te n d  to  re a c t  s im ila r ly  to  s im ila r  
e n v ir o n m e n ts , a n d  so p r o d u c e s  c la ss  
m o r a l it ie s  a n d  class  lo y a lt ie s  w ith in  
th e  b ro a d  fr a m e w o r k  o f  o u r  c o m m o n  
h e r ita g e . On th e  o th e r  h a n d , it  is 
p r e c is e ly  th e  fa c t  th a t  a l l  m e n , th o u g h  
s im ila r ,  a r c  n o t id e n t ic a l,  th a t  h a s  
e n a b le d  n a t u r a l  se le c tio n  to  w o rk  u p o n  
th e  in d iv id u a l  d if fe re n c e s  a m o n g  o u r  
e a r ly  a n c e s to rs  to  p r o d u c e  th a t  c o m ­
m o n  h e r ita g e  w h ic h  so  s h a r p ly  d i f f e r ­
e n t ia te s  u s fro m  e v e n  o u r  n e a re s t  
r e la t iv e s  a m o n g  th e  o th e r  a n im a ls . 
S im i la r i t y  a n d  d is s im ila r it y  fo rm  a 
d ia le c t ic a l  u n it y  o f  o p p o s ite s , as th e y  
d o  in  e v e r y  e v o lu t io n a r y  p ro ce ss .
* T his them e is developed m ore fully 
in K ropotkin’s M utual  Aid,  which, 
though proved by later research to be 
wrong in some details, is still probably 
the best available text on the  subject 
as a w holt
In the present era. when the  whole 
of hum anity  has become socially and 
economically interdependent, and the 
very success of the species is tending 
to exhaust and destroy the very en ­
vironm ent that renders hum an life 
possible, our highly developed social 
instincts become m ore than  ever es­
sential to the very survival of our 
species.
T here  is therefore an objectively 
de inable sense in which all those 
who, like Nixon, Gorton, Hughes, Mc­
Mahon and the rest, preach and 
practise genocide and exploitation of
ii an by m an, and consider investments 
n ore im portant than  hum an life and 
a hum an environm ent, are themselves 
hum an only in a physiological and 
biochemical sense, while socially and 
ecologically they have ceased to be 
Inin an anti become dangerous vermin, 
which m ust be destroyed or rendered 
harmless if hum anity  itself is to su r­
vive.
T h e  views here expressed are not, 
of comse, purely scientific, since they 
imply, in addition to the scientifically 
asceitainable facts I have adduced, the 
aesthetic judgem ent th a t life is more 
beautiful than death , the em otional 
judgem ent that hum anity  should live 
011, the moral judgem ent th a t our 
children and their children have a 
right to inherit an earth at least as 
rich and beautiful as that which we 
inherited  from our fathers. N everthe­
less. this is the only possible basis for 
a political philosophy relevant to the 
present epoch, and, arm ing ourselves 
with this philosophy, we shall win 
(he world for communism, not by 
appeal to scientific texts, bu t by 
appeal to the common hum anity  and 
basic m orality of the overwhelm ing
11 ajority ol our fellow-men.
A r t h u r  W .  R u d k i n
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Books
THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
OF AUSTRALIA, a Short His­
tory, by Alastair Davidson. Hoo­
ver Institution Press, 214pp., 
$7.00.
DESPITE the  lim its the au thor set 
himself with his book (a short history, 
m ainly for students and scholars, and 
prim arily  an institu tional history with 
little  analysis of social and economic 
conditions), it m ust still have been a 
very difficult task to write it, and for 
doing so Dr. Davidson deserves congra­
tulations.
It is also difficult to review adequate­
ly, partly  on account of this fram e­
work, for history is a unity, not the 
sum of separate parts. T hus there is 
an overall thesis advanced which has 
qu ite  some validity, but it suffers 
from lack of dep th  and all-sidedness. 
On the o ther hand, considering that 
the  book was completed in 1967, the 
au tho r shows more perspicacity about 
the n a tu re  and decisiveness of the 
changes in the  CPA (only then  emerg 
ing) than  m any critics with the benefit 
of another three  years of more obvious 
and rap id  developm ent.
T h e  facts assembled are of great 
value, a lthough I believe lacking in 
some key areas, and one would hope 
that the wealth of facts would mean 
th a t this w ould stim ulate serious study 
o t the  history of the CPA. But some 
of the reviews and comments on the 
subject indicate th a t the conclusions 
have been draw n before the study, and 
th a t the w orth of any work is de te r­
m ined by how closely or otherwise it 
conforms w ith those preconceived a t­
titudes.
From the right we have Peter Cole- 
ii.an (Bulletin,  May 2) whose main 
criticism is that Davidson "does not 
see the party  lor what it is” because 
he (Davidson) leaves some doubts aboui 
unproved accusations of a bashing in 
a union over 20 years ago, though he 
(Coleman) can cite none since. (It will 
be interesting to see what Mr. Cole 
m an has to say about the  actual bash­
ing of a girl student by Australian 
racists shouting  "kill the reds” — SMH  
May 1!) — which is today, and h istor­
ically, m ore typical — as indeed is 
also the case in the use of violence 
in the  unions). W riters on the left 
also show a tendency to judge h isto ri­
cal m atters by w hether they conform 
w ith their already decided political 
conclusions. (See Doug W hite’s review. 
Arena  No. 21, and the resolution of a 
section of the Fourth In ternational, In ­
ternational  No. 12).
In order to try to avoid this error — 
adm ittedly difficult — I specify the  three 
m ain criteria  I use in judging the book: 
the validity of the over-all thesis; the 
adequacy of the facts; the accuracy of 
the facts.
T h e  overall thesis is " th a t the vicissi­
tudes of CPA history were due to the 
(act th a t it thought the Russian revo­
lution was entirely relevant to A ustra­
lian history. It was not" (p.183). Brok 
en down from this broad generality 
there  are involved such questions as the 
validity or otherwise of “ Leninism " for 
\u stra lian  conditions; adoption or 
otherwise of the "A ustralian socialist 
trad itio n ”; and in line with this fol­
lowing (or not) a policy of “National 
com m unism ".
These are all large questions which 
I can only touch on here. T h e  specific 
m eaning which m ight be a ttrib u ted  to 
the term  “ Leninism ” is very difficult to 
define, bu t accepting the way Dr. Dav­
idson uses the term , I think he has 
tended to accept (as the Com munist 
Party  did; as I did) what was purvey­
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ed under Stalin as “ M arxism -Lenin­
ism’’ as being "Leninism .” It is not. 
Blit leaving this aside, 1 agree w ith Dr. 
Davidson th a t "m arxism -leninism ” was 
acccpted m ainly w ithout question and 
that the results have greatly ham pered 
the party 's developm ent. Dr. Davidson 
also, I believe, makes organisation ('‘d e ­
mocratic centralism " — and in its 
Stalinist version) a weightier p a rt of 
the whole than  it was, (which is not 
to deny that it is im portant). It is also 
hard to see on what basis it is conclud­
ed that renewed emphasis on the im ­
portance of factory organisation was 
"another indication that the party  had 
not changed its (bad) ways” (p.99). 
Even now when factory organisation 
is receiving considerable a tten tion , it 
is hard  to see why Dr. Davidson would 
think it should not.
“National Com munism " also means 
d ifferent things to d ifferent people, bu t 
taking it (as Dr. Davidson does) to 
mean refusal to accept the  hegemony 
of o ther parties — whether Russian or 
Chinese — or to regard their th eo re ti­
cal pronouncem ents and policies as 
beyond question, and the liberation  of 
thinking given the realisation th a t 
issues m ust be analysed righ t through 
by each revolutionary movem ent, then  
the CPA has now indeed tu rned  in th a t 
direction. (Some take “national com ­
m unism " to ipso facto involve a d e ­
p artu re  from "internationalism  ”, bu t 
this docs not follow from the above 
definition; nor is it characteristic of 
the CPA todav.)
T h e  question of the "A ustralian soc­
ialist trad itio n ”, and the supposed re ­
tu rn  to it by the CPA, is far m ore 
problem atical, both in the in te rp re ta ­
tion of what th a t tradition  m ight be, 
and the desirability or otherwise of em ­
bracing it. Leaving aside organisation, 
the m ain issue raised by Dr. Davidson 
involves the  a ttitude  to be adopted  to 
the Labor Party. He says: "Indeed, the 
new line logically led to the belief th a t 
the role of the CPA was to be a ginger
group on the left of the ALP. As in 
th e  socialist parties before 1920 which 
actually adopted such a role, the  first 
question also provoked the second, 
‘W hy stay outside?' ” (p. 168).
But the new line in my opinion 
does not involve such conclusions, 
either logically o r in lacl. And if it 
was the trad ition  (it was only ol a 
section, as Dr. Davidson himself points 
ou t on p. 4)), so m uch the woise lor 
the tradition . It needed to be broken. 
T h e  same m ight be said of the trad i­
tions of the o ther sections of socialists 
m entioned — those organised in isol­
ated clubs, and those confining them ­
selves to work in the  trade unions. T his 
does not m ean th a t the a ttitu d e  oi 
the CPA to the ALP, as the mass party, 
has not varied widely and been gravely 
mistaken on m any occasions; bu t this 
does not logically or otherwise lead to 
the conclusion that there  should be a 
re tu rn  to the "ginger g ro u p ” idea. 
T his has been followed by the Fourth  
In ternational for over 30 years and by 
other, m ore trad itional socialists, loi 
about 80; bu t have they proved its 
revolutionary effectiveness?
Nor are all the changes in a ttitu d e  
to the Labor Party to be taken, in my 
view, as errors. It seems "logical ' to 
me th a t as the Labor Party changes its 
policy (actual or declared) then  d if­
ferences in approach are necessary. Dr. 
Davidson recognises this, bu t seems lot 
exam ple to place equal blam e for the 
policy of the ALP in the cold war on 
the CP as on the Labor Party (sec last 
par., p. 103 and first par. on p. 107). 
I do not think the view can be sus­
tained th a t if the CP had been more 
"m oderate" in 1946-49 the Labor Party 
policy would have been basically d if­
ferent.
T h e  stress pu t by Dr. Davidson on 
"m oderation” (e.g. pp. 99, 114, 139, 142, 
143, 158) has a po in t, of course, for 
m any occasions. But on o ther occa­
sions, including the recent period.
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som ething q u ite  different seems to me 
to be necessary. T h e  recently held 
L'lind Congress documents spell out the 
party 's present views, and for some 
treatm ent see p. 52 of the present 
issue. In general, 011 a ttitude  to th_- 
ALP, it is interesting to note that 
around the  tim e of the 1966 Federal 
election sections of the new left were 
enthusiastically looking to the Labor 
Party, and even join ing it in some 
num bers. In 1970 m any of the same 
people are ' d isenchanted '' and dismiss 
or oppose the Labor Party altogether, 
(the same has happened in Britain). I 
th ink  exam ination of history (which of 
course "proves” noth ing in any con­
clusive sense) nevertheless provides 
m uch m ore evidence in support of the 
present CPA policy than  for such ex­
tremes (to which it also has been 
prone in the past).
On the general question of tradition: 
T ru e  it is of great im portance; bu t is 
more diffuse, less definable and deeper 
than  a political a ttitu d e  on a p a rticu ­
lar question. Furtherm ore, revolution­
aries m ust inevitably set ou t to break 
at least some  traditions; so they arc 
not of value in themselves. And if a 
socialist trad ition  could be established 
in a period of 30 years (p. 4), why can­
not a trad ition  be established in 50?
I would argue th a t it has been, to a 
degree, and agree with Dan O Neill 
an this po in t (see p. 64 on the present 
issue).
As to the  adequacy of the facts p re ­
sented it may seem captious, in view 
of Or. Davidson's diligence, to raise 
the question. But I believe it is a m at­
ter oi some substance that little is said 
of the  CPA's consistent and consider­
able support for national Iibei ation 
movements, righ t from the tim e of its 
foundation. T h is is no t to say that 
there is no ground  for criticism, but 
the general p ictu re  is very positive 1 
believe, including on the Aborigines 
and New G uinea as well as for exam ­
ple the  Indonesian and Chinese revolu­
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tions, opposition to the war in Korea, 
and especially to the war in Vietnam.
T ru e , Indonesia, Korea and Vietnam 
are all very different, bu t it should be 
clear now, if it was not before, that 
they all involved the same issues of 
anti-US im perialism  in its aims in 
Asia, and the subordination of Aus­
tralian  policy to this. These issues 
loom very large today, bu t there are 
only passing references to them  in the 
book. T here  is also a lack of treatm ent 
01 theoretical developm ent in  the 
CPA s th ink ing  over the period.
Accuracy of facts involves m atters 
of substance and in terpreta tion , as 
well as m undane questions. On the 
form er 1 would dispute for exam ple 
the im putation  of opportunism  in sup 
port for the Spanish Governm ent in 
the civil war (p. 85); the statem ent 011 
p. 93 th a t the “pro letaria t" became 
sm aller during  the war because of 
au tom ation — in  fact it became much 
larger; the view that the 12th Congress 
of the  CPA exceeded the broadness of 
D im itrov's un ited  front (p. 78); o r that 
Frank Johnson skilfully h id  his loyalty 
to H ill (p. 154) — it was one of the 
most open secrets on record!
On the latter, most probably reflect 
poor proof reading. In the quotation  
on p. 135 "m om ent” becomes “move­
m ent"; 011 p. 63, six lines from the bo t­
tom there  is an obviously ou t of place 
"not"; J. Nolan becomes J. Molan (p. 
155) and Horace R atliff becomes H or­
ace Ratcliff (pp. 81 and 83).
W hile some of the above criticisms 
arc substantial, the book is a very val­
uable one, indeed essential reading.
1 hope a I com m unists and all others 
on the  left do read it because of the 
vital issues raised, w hether one agrees 
with a particu lar in terpreta tion  or not.
I agree with Rex M ortim er (Nation,.  
March 21) th a t there is far from ade­
quate  explanation  of the deeper causes 
and m otivations of the changes of the
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lust d e c a d e , th o u g h  I th in k  M o r t im e r  
h im s e lf  sh o w s  s u r p r is in g ly  l i t t le  u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g  fo r  o n e  w h o  w a s  a  p r o m in e n t  
p a r t ic ip a n t  in  it lo r  a p e r io d . O f 
co u rse  th e  c h a lle n g e  is to  h a v e  a go  
o n e se lf. I w il l  a t te m p t  in  a  c o m in g  
issue o l  th e  jo u r n a l  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  
p ro cesses, as 1  see th e m , th a t  to o k  
p la c e  in  m y s e lf  a n d  th e  p a r ty  d u r in g  
th e  60 s.
E r i c  A a r o n s
STUDENT CASUALTIES, by 
Anthony Ryle. Alan Lane, The 
Penguin Press, 152pp., $4.50.
AS, at the tim e of writing, six US 
students have been shot dead on cam ­
pus by N ational Guards w ithin the 
last twelve days, I should perhaps 
begin by stating that Anthony R yles 
book is neither on US students or this 
type of casualty. R ather, it is about 
the em otional problem s and academic 
failures (not very often separate) of 
students in British universities, and 
about the role of the university in 
the treatm ent of such issues. T hough  
much is of little  direct relevance to 
the A ustralian situation, discussion ol 
British university entrance req u ire ­
ments and student services from this 
psychological angle presents the reader 
with an interesting opportun ity  for 
making comparisons.
Student Casualties’ fourteen ch ap ­
ters deal with four overlapping issues: 
the character of the undergraduate  
and his university, the incidence and 
n a tu re  of psychological disorder 
amongst students, the qualitative ques­
tions of failure (including dropping  
ou t and failure to come up to po ­
tential), and more social problem s such 
as drug  abuse, sex, suicide, and p ro ­
test in the  university.
T h e  lirst of these sections deals 
at some length with m ethods of u n i­
versity selection and the  student's early 
com m itm ent to the n a tu re  of his fu tu re  
studies. He notices that, for reasons 
he a ttribu tes to the d istu rb ing  n a tu re  
of the m odern world, undergraduates 
tend to place more im portance on sub­
jects dem anding divergent, questioning 
thinking such as those taught in  the 
Arts faculty and in the scientific-cum- 
hum an itarian  subjects of psychology 
and sociology ra ther than  the more 
ordered, convergent ones. In sheer 
num bers, of course, th e  scientists and 
technocrats dom inate the universities: 
speaking as the head of the University 
of Sussex H ealth  Service, though, Ryle 
linds his m ajority of d isturbed s tu ­
dents amongst the divergent thinkers.
On the subject of the student's fre­
quently  disillusioned reaction to his 
university Rvlc, w ithout adopting a 
laissez-faire a ttitu d e  to the institu tion  
himself, qu ite  reasonably also blames 
student rom anticism : Basically this 
is a d isappointm ent at finding that 
the world here is no less imperfect than  
elsewhere . . . "
In the light of such thought it may 
still appear surprising that up to 42% 
of undergraduates suffer from anything 
from m ild psychological disorders up 
to severe disorders requ iring  hospital 
admission. T h e  most frequently occur- 
ing psychotic disorders amongst s tu ­
dents are schizophrenia, manic-depres- 
sion and schizo affective disorders but 
frequently even these cases may be 
brought under some control presum ­
ably since students, being young, tend 
to be diagnosed early. Some extrem e 
disorders seem no less frequent amongst 
non-student peers. Less dangerous 
neuroses, however, occur m ore fre­
quently  amongst students, especially 
in the hum anities, are frequently  re ­
lated to questions of role-identity , are 
often n u rtu red  by the university a t ­
m osphere and tend to be most fre­
quen t amongst students from non 
academic backgrounds.
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T h e  question of studen t failure is 
so widely discussed recapitulation of 
Ryle's discussion seem unnecessary. 
Schonell's Promise anil Performance 
and A.C.E.R. reports have covered 
A ustralian students' problem s in these 
respects thoroughly. Ryle here adds 
his nam e to the  list of those advocat­
ing freer exam ination systems and his 
chapter on exam neuroses repeats what 
are m ainly comtnonsense and well 
known argum ents.
Finally, Ryle looks at the generally 
social problem s and issues encountered 
in a university. Most of these differ 
from peer groups' only in degree — 
m ore drugs, more protest and, it 
would seem, less sex characterise s tu ­
den t life. Flowever the suicide rate of 
students is three to ten times that of 
the  students ' peers. On these issues 
Ryle prefers to estim ate rates and to 
recom mend university attitudes — 
largely of tolerance and of civil ra ther 
than  in ternal action when action is 
deem ed necessary. T here  is little  a t­
tem pt to seek the causes of social 
phenom ena as these arc not seen as 
being in the psychologist's dom ain 
except to the degree to which case 
histories suggest a cause for an in ­
dividual predilection.
Should this fail to suggest an excit­
ing or original book, Ryle’s aims 
have not been overlooked. W hat Stu­
dent Casualties attem pts is a h an d ­
book for student advisors, tutors and, 
if they can avoid indulgent self- 
analysis, undergraduates themselves. 
Ryle has acknowledged the student 
population  as a m inority but one 
whose problem s are encountered in a 
special environm ent that is at once 
sheltering and provocative. W hat the 
book finally dem onstrates is that 
students are as m uch adolescents as 
their brothers in  the work force and, 
as such, are faced with problem s of 
identity  and role transference (son or 
daughter to adu lt, social outsider to 
m em ber of society) the theory of which
they may well be studying at the same 
tim e in any num ber of academic dis 
ciplines.
On the subject of docum entation the 
specialist may well question Ryle s 
references. Student Casualties is large­
ly a well ordered bu t comtnonsense 
book whose ra th e r theory-free layout 
is presum ably intended to present a 
n eu tra l front to the bigot or u n ­
sym pathetic teacher who needs to be 
wooed in to  respect for students' in ­
d iv idual problem s and his responsibility 
for seeing th a t they are attended to. 
However Ryle makes no m ention of 
child developm ent theorists of the 
status of Ausubel or H avinghurst or 
Piaget (whose Moral Judgements of 
the Child  — 1955 — gives a fuller 
account of Ryle's own concept of 
adolescent developm ent); on the sub­
ject of sex he relies on Schofield s 
study that, completed in 1965, p re ­
dates the  'permissive society' and the 
bulk of the  massive shift in sexual 
mores of the young and m ust be con­
sidered outdated . Equally unfortunately  
Ryle's belief that drug  takers are 
passive and sexually insecure or that 
there is no significant difference be­
tween students who have sexual re ­
lationships and those who do not are 
off-the-cuff and not substantiated in 
the text by references or case studies.
T his should not detract from the 
general usefulness of Student Casual­
ties. As a handbook it is so perceptive 
and well laid ou t it opens the  pos­
sibility for some generalising both 
about the  values of the student p o p u ­
lation and about the way the u n i­
versity may serve the students through 
health  services that include a full time 
psychiatric staff, the establishm ent of 
a greater degree of teacher-student 
rap p o rt and co-operation in situations 
where students require  guidance, and 
adm inistrative sym pathy for the less 
well ad justed  in the place of what 
is often m ere bureaucracy.
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